Friday, May 15, 2009

Civil Military Relations - The Soldier & the State

The military has to be understood as the soldier, the army and the armed forces. The armed forces and civil-military relations (CMR) are a dynamic component of governance. At this time, we have the worst ever CMR in the history of Nepal. Thus, it will be worthwhile to understand the subject based on its historical, socio-cultural and psycho-political background.

Samuel P. Huntington, in his book The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, has advanced the theory of objective civilian control. This theory advocates that the optimal means of asserting control over the armed forces is to professionalize them and render them politically sterile and neutral. This is in contrast to subjective control, which involves placing legal and institutional restrictions on the military's autonomy.

According to the “current theory”, the military should remain physically and ideologically separated from political institutions and should not get involved in political decision-making. The “concordance theory”, as an alternative theory, proposes that the three partners -- the military, the political elite and the citizenry -- should aim for a cooperative relationship (Rebecca L. Schieff).

A mix of both objective and subjective civilian control over the army and exercise of the current and concordance theories exists in Nepal.

At present, the issue of civilian supremacy and civil control over the army is high on the agenda. One of the most important principles of the Anglo-American system of government is the principle of civilian supremacy over the military and the principle of civilian control (Kenneth W. Kemp and Charles Hudlin).

But on legal and moral reasons, the system allows three clear cases of disobedience to order, i.e., orders that are illegal, orders that violate international law and orders that are immoral. According to U.S. law, a soldier is not only excused from obeying illegal orders but is not even permitted to obey them.

Charles de Gaulle’s refusal to follow Pétain’s order that the French should not take up arms against the Germans, and Field Marshall S. Manekshaw’s refusal to follow Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s order to launch an offensive against East Pakistan during the monsoon have been justified in the greater interests of the nation. But unnecessary exaggeration of the issue of recruitment by the Nepal Army has pushed the delicate CMR to its worst level.

CMR in Nepal could be examined through its historical background as follows:

1. Pre-Unification: The entire citizenry stood as a fighting force and fought alongside their king and commanders.

2. During unification and expansion: This was a period of military campaign for unification, and a kind of conscription existed which established the belief that “every soldier is a citizen and every citizen is a soldier”. In the latter part of the unification campaign, the heavy influence of a few elite groups (Thapa, Pandey and a few others) over politics and the military prevailed leading to the ill practice of nepotism, favouritism and the chakari system.

3. 104 years of the Rana regime: A system of clear distinction between the ruler and the ruled prevailed throughout the nation. A culture of family generals and public soldier and nepotism, favouritism and the chakari pratha became the norm of the day.

4. CMR during the democratic transition can be divided into two parts.

(a) Post-Rana and panchayat period (1951-1991): The army, among others, remained one of the most important elements of national power. The influence of the Ranas and some elite groups prevailed in the army. The army got exposed to the outside world by way of foreign training and peacekeeping missions. The intake of the officer corps from the people in general increased, and modernization of the army started.

(b) Multi-party democratic government (1991-2009): The 1991 constitution of Nepal has given civilian control over the army. But the democratic government failed to take the army into confidence. They have humiliated the army by depriving them of their basic needs (clothing, shelter, training, allowances and facilities) and even tried to affect their morals. Had there been better CMR, the Maoist armed movement would have been sorted out in its initial days. Poor CMR became a blessing in disguise for the success of the Maoist movement.

In its search for guardianship, the army became close to the king. The king, being the patron of the army, the civilian authority did not have much control over the army. The army still remained impoverished and deprived of their essential requirements. The army failed the test of time to prove their so well understood loyalty towards the king and failed to save the monarchy.

CMR during 2009 deteriorated further and reached a stage of confrontation. The army is humiliated again on the issue of abrupt and irrational retirement of eight competent generals. This is nothing but a result of psyche of vendetta of Maoist party in the pretext of civilian supremacy and civilian control over the army. The country is divided on this issue and it is time to be wary about the disobedience by the army.

The Nepal Army is an apolitical, disciplined, cohesive and traditional institution. It is a voluntary and equal-opportunity employment organization. It honours civilian supremacy under democratic civilian control. It is inclusive, and has become a more assorted and homogeneous army. Certain Janajatis are dominant in the higher ranks and decision making positions. Madheshis are less in number simply because of their professional choice.

The factors impeding good CMR need to be identified. There are ego problems between the army and the government. There is a false understanding that the army is not loyal to the people. There is lack of knowledge and understanding about the army and army officers. The isolated nature of the army offered fewer opportunities to mix with civilians. A weak Ministry of Defence and a policy of neglect regarding CMR are other factors.

This calls for new initiatives and efforts to build confidence and understanding between the army and civilians. They include defining the role of the army, facilitating communication and constructive engagement, getting to know each other’s strengths and weaknesses to change the jaundiced perception about the army, addressing the issue of the victims and the guilty during the conflict, addressing the integration issue and enhancing the image of the army in a democratic context and transparency in employment.

The exercise of civilian supremacy should be more along the lines of confidence building than creating an environment of domination in the name of civilian control. The relationship between civilians and the military needs to be synchronized well in the existing social structure and dynamics of psychology, philosophy, culture and politics to generate synergy. The civil society has a crucial role to play as a beneficiary, watchdog and whistle blower. A strong and proactive Track-II initiative is of dire need along with Track-I and Track-II initiatives to enhance CMR.

Formulation and implementation of a National Security Policy, restructuring the National Security Council, employment of a professional security advisor, reform in the army and the Ministry of Defence, study and interactions on the subject are some of the measures that can be pursued for better CMR.

According to Huntington, future CMR will be shaped by the success and failure of civilian governments in implementing economic reform and preserving law and order. The subject of CMR is new to Nepal, and its enhancement need not be emphasized in the changed context. It is time to mend differences, develop understanding and build confidence instead of exchanging rhetoric. In the changed context, there is a paradigm shift in the nature of CMR, and there is a greater need for a civil-military partnership than ever before.

Published in 'The Kathmandu Post' on 18 March 2009

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