Civil Military Relations - The Soldier & the State

The military has to be understood as the soldier, the army and the armed forces. The armed forces and civil-military relations (CMR) are a dynamic component of governance. At this time, we have the worst ever CMR in the history of Nepal. Thus, it will be worthwhile to understand the subject based on its historical, socio-cultural and psycho-political background.

Samuel P. Huntington, in his book The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, has advanced the theory of objective civilian control. This theory advocates that the optimal means of asserting control over the armed forces is to professionalize them and render them politically sterile and neutral. This is in contrast to subjective control, which involves placing legal and institutional restrictions on the military's autonomy.

According to the “current theory”, the military should remain physically and ideologically separated from political institutions and should not get involved in political decision-making. The “concordance theory”, as an alternative theory, proposes that the three partners -- the military, the political elite and the citizenry -- should aim for a cooperative relationship (Rebecca L. Schieff).

A mix of both objective and subjective civilian control over the army and exercise of the current and concordance theories exists in Nepal.

At present, the issue of civilian supremacy and civil control over the army is high on the agenda. One of the most important principles of the Anglo-American system of government is the principle of civilian supremacy over the military and the principle of civilian control (Kenneth W. Kemp and Charles Hudlin).

But on legal and moral reasons, the system allows three clear cases of disobedience to order, i.e., orders that are illegal, orders that violate international law and orders that are immoral. According to U.S. law, a soldier is not only excused from obeying illegal orders but is not even permitted to obey them.

Charles de Gaulle’s refusal to follow Pétain’s order that the French should not take up arms against the Germans, and Field Marshall S. Manekshaw’s refusal to follow Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s order to launch an offensive against East Pakistan during the monsoon have been justified in the greater interests of the nation. But unnecessary exaggeration of the issue of recruitment by the Nepal Army has pushed the delicate CMR to its worst level.

CMR in Nepal could be examined through its historical background as follows:

1. Pre-Unification: The entire citizenry stood as a fighting force and fought alongside their king and commanders.

2. During unification and expansion: This was a period of military campaign for unification, and a kind of conscription existed which established the belief that “every soldier is a citizen and every citizen is a soldier”. In the latter part of the unification campaign, the heavy influence of a few elite groups (Thapa, Pandey and a few others) over politics and the military prevailed leading to the ill practice of nepotism, favouritism and the chakari system.

3. 104 years of the Rana regime: A system of clear distinction between the ruler and the ruled prevailed throughout the nation. A culture of family generals and public soldier and nepotism, favouritism and the chakari pratha became the norm of the day.

4. CMR during the democratic transition can be divided into two parts.

(a) Post-Rana and panchayat period (1951-1991): The army, among others, remained one of the most important elements of national power. The influence of the Ranas and some elite groups prevailed in the army. The army got exposed to the outside world by way of foreign training and peacekeeping missions. The intake of the officer corps from the people in general increased, and modernization of the army started.

(b) Multi-party democratic government (1991-2009): The 1991 constitution of Nepal has given civilian control over the army. But the democratic government failed to take the army into confidence. They have humiliated the army by depriving them of their basic needs (clothing, shelter, training, allowances and facilities) and even tried to affect their morals. Had there been better CMR, the Maoist armed movement would have been sorted out in its initial days. Poor CMR became a blessing in disguise for the success of the Maoist movement.

In its search for guardianship, the army became close to the king. The king, being the patron of the army, the civilian authority did not have much control over the army. The army still remained impoverished and deprived of their essential requirements. The army failed the test of time to prove their so well understood loyalty towards the king and failed to save the monarchy.

CMR during 2009 deteriorated further and reached a stage of confrontation. The army is humiliated again on the issue of abrupt and irrational retirement of eight competent generals. This is nothing but a result of psyche of vendetta of Maoist party in the pretext of civilian supremacy and civilian control over the army. The country is divided on this issue and it is time to be wary about the disobedience by the army.

The Nepal Army is an apolitical, disciplined, cohesive and traditional institution. It is a voluntary and equal-opportunity employment organization. It honours civilian supremacy under democratic civilian control. It is inclusive, and has become a more assorted and homogeneous army. Certain Janajatis are dominant in the higher ranks and decision making positions. Madheshis are less in number simply because of their professional choice.

The factors impeding good CMR need to be identified. There are ego problems between the army and the government. There is a false understanding that the army is not loyal to the people. There is lack of knowledge and understanding about the army and army officers. The isolated nature of the army offered fewer opportunities to mix with civilians. A weak Ministry of Defence and a policy of neglect regarding CMR are other factors.

This calls for new initiatives and efforts to build confidence and understanding between the army and civilians. They include defining the role of the army, facilitating communication and constructive engagement, getting to know each other’s strengths and weaknesses to change the jaundiced perception about the army, addressing the issue of the victims and the guilty during the conflict, addressing the integration issue and enhancing the image of the army in a democratic context and transparency in employment.

The exercise of civilian supremacy should be more along the lines of confidence building than creating an environment of domination in the name of civilian control. The relationship between civilians and the military needs to be synchronized well in the existing social structure and dynamics of psychology, philosophy, culture and politics to generate synergy. The civil society has a crucial role to play as a beneficiary, watchdog and whistle blower. A strong and proactive Track-II initiative is of dire need along with Track-I and Track-II initiatives to enhance CMR.

Formulation and implementation of a National Security Policy, restructuring the National Security Council, employment of a professional security advisor, reform in the army and the Ministry of Defence, study and interactions on the subject are some of the measures that can be pursued for better CMR.

According to Huntington, future CMR will be shaped by the success and failure of civilian governments in implementing economic reform and preserving law and order. The subject of CMR is new to Nepal, and its enhancement need not be emphasized in the changed context. It is time to mend differences, develop understanding and build confidence instead of exchanging rhetoric. In the changed context, there is a paradigm shift in the nature of CMR, and there is a greater need for a civil-military partnership than ever before.

Published in 'The Kathmandu Post' on 18 March 2009

General Katawal Issue: A Pretext For Multiple Interests

The Maoist party led government's plan to discharge the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Rukmangad Katawal based on the "Army Act, 2063" drew overwhelming reactions against such move from many quarters- domestic and foreign alike; but this has happened. Why the Maoist party did face such an overwhelming reactions and where did they go wrong in their assessment? This cannot be viewed simply by limiting the issue between Nepal army (NA) and Maoist led government. The reasons for the over amplified issue lies on the clash of interests of various stakeholders which need to be analyzed for the greater interest of the nation and need to be acted accordingly.

International interest

1. India's Interest: Maoist movement in India has become the thrown in the flesh of the Indian internal security. In this regard the proliferation of Maoist movement and Maoist ideologically driven strong government in Nepal does not suit the Indian interest. India's interest is to pacify the Maoist movement in Nepal so as to contain the possible greater proliferation in the region. The greater aim is to weaken the Maoist movement in India. Another aim is to transfer the Maoist Party to a democratic left front of Nepal. That was the reason why India played a decisive role for striking the 12 points agreement and signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). India's support for Maoist party will stand good as long as the Maoist party agrees to transfer themselves to a more democratic left front and serve the India's interest in multidimensional issues including some of the contentious issue affecting Nepal's international relations.Another reason is the long established traditional and good relation between the Indian army and Nepalese army. The two armies enjoy the best of the relations; and there is a tradition of reciprocity to honor each other army chief as the Honorary COAS of other army. Besides the Gurkhas of Indian army and personal relations among many officers also play an important role in areas of each other's interest.A major security interest of India is not let to have a heavy northern influence in various spheres of Nepalese affairs. India's greater security interest covers the Himalayan range as the northern edge of their security umbrella. Thus any government who is likely to allow the more freedom of Northern neighbor's activity in Nepal and more so closer to the Indian boarder is taken not as the welcoming move by India.

2. American Interest: Ideologically United States of America does not accept in principle any kind of communist rule in any country of the world, and Nepal is no exception. The strategic importance of Nepal because of its geo-political position between two big and ideologically diverse countries does not need to be amplified more. USA has a standard of establishing large, medium and small sized embassy (super large sized embassy in Iraq - an exception) according to their political and security interest in the country. The establishment of medium sized embassy in Nepal simply justifies the magnitude of American Interest in Nepal.

3. China's Interest: The Chinese interest lies in the protection of Tibetan Security issue. They seem to have identified the Maoist party cadres as a potent security body to stop the free Tibetan movement from the south. Thus the Maoist affiliated militant and sister organization could be a reliable safeguard as the work force in development projects bordering Tibet and Nepal. This serves the interest of both China and Maoist party of Nepal.

4. European Countries' Interest: EU nations do not have major security interest in Nepal but do have major concern toward the ongoing peace process. They want to protect their established image and role as the main peace broker and negotiator in Nepal as well. Besides their paramount concern lies with the human rights issues and development work in Nepal.

Domestic Interests

5. Political Party's Interest: The major political parties have realized that the Maoist party's strategic move was to contain them through achieving control over the Nepal Army. The overwhelming reaction by the political parties against the Maoist led Government's action to remove the Gen Katwal should not be understood as the mere support to Gen Katwal rather this need to be perceived as the support shown to the NA with an aim to protect their party interest. They seem to have realized that their existence will be threatened if the NA as the formidable hurdle for Maoist party comes under Maoist influence. The political parties seem to have realized the importance of an apolitical and professional national army for the protection of greater interest of the nation and the party.

6. Maoist Interest: The Maoist party's immediate interest is to establish control over the NA by removing the COAS before completing his 3 years term and to appoint a new COAS of their choice or someone who will support their aspiration. Their greater interest is to achieve an official recognition of the Maoist combatants as a national security force with established ranks structure; and integrate majority of the combatants in NA so as to gain control over it. This way they can aspire to achieve their grand strategy to establish People's Republic.

7. Nepal Army's Interest: Nepal army as the most important element of national power has their own concern to protect their interest and existence. NA being the main stakeholder of integration issue and peace process wants to preserve their organization intact as an apolitical institution. They want to preserve their tradition, established practice and remain as professional army under the democratic norms of the nation.

Hence, the reaction of excessive dimension against the Maoist move to remove the COAS has come not because of the support to General Katwal but because of the support to the NA driven by paramount interests of political parties and other stake holders. Individual Interests and vindictive attitude of Maoist party is no less important. General Katwal is just a pretext and not a cause of conflict rather it is a clash of interest of several stake holders. As the political interference did take place and the COAS General Katwal is discharged and Lt Gen Khadka is appointed as acting COAS by the cabinet decision (rather Maoist party's decision) but the game is not yet over. General Katwal will have difficulty to justify his refusal to accept the Government's decision and the role of the president and Supreme Commander of the Nepal Army becomes crucial at this critical juncture of national crisis. If the president could not find an amicable way out to pacify this issue, General Katwal most likely will knock the door of Supreme Court for justice. A "Stay Order" if at all is issued in favor of Gen Katwal the existence, rationality and morale ground of Maoist party and its top leader will be compromised. In that case Maoist party's next action most likely will be nationwide disturbances and even to the worst the combatants of cantonments may defy the CPA and leave the camp with weapons. If so happens it will be sad state of affairs which will compromise the national interest, party's interest, national army's interest and international interest for the sake of single party interest and individual ambition.

Published in 'The Kathmandu Post' on 05 May, 2009

Interview on BBC Nepali Service