Professional loyalty toward the commander and the commander as the professional guardian of the subordinates is the professional ethics of command in military, and the foundation of emotional relationship and discipline. This is the bondage which brings the cohesiveness in the force and motivates the troops even for the supreme sacrifice for the cause.
Then Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) top leaders tirelessly recited the contributory and legendary (Garimamayo) role and history of RNA and their unshakable loyalty for the king and the nation. But the unshakable loyalty toward the king and for the institution of monarchy turned to be nothing but a hypocritical discourse. Why hypocritical?- because this was the institution which has supported to confine if not imprison the king for 104 years under the Rana rule; did not or could not support the King to abort the Kot-Parba – a coup staged by Jung Bahadur to establish the Rana family rule in Nepal; and this is the institution which did not or could not take stand in support of the king during Janaandolan –II; did nothing while the king was suspended and ultimately gave up its long questioned loyalty towards the institution of monarchism and witnessed its demise with no grief or rejoice. In terms of the institution of monarchy and the king in particular never had been so badly betrayed while the perceived loyalty of RNA top leader turned out to be a biggest hoax and hypocrisy and forced the king to bow down before the people's mandate or under certain group of people's interest. That was time too late for the institution of monarchy and in particular to the ex- king Gyanendra to realize.
This would have been better to preserve the institution of monarchism rather than doing away with it for the future of Nepal and making a better New Nepal - now it is just a wishful thinking. This may be or big MAY BE? - Good for the future of Nepal and its people which is yet to be experienced. The institution of monarchism need not have suffered for the mistakes, blunders and unethical deeds committed by the erstwhile king Gyanendra and his son the erstwhile Crown Prince Paras. Gone are the days and there is no "IF" in the history; so it is time to learn from the mistakes made during the recently made history, mistakes committed while reigning the country between the period of Janaandolan I & II and during the Panchayet Period and between dawn of democracy 2007 BS and Panchayet rule.
Had the institution of monarchism not been carried away by the hypocritical loyalty of few close aids the late king Birendra and his family would not have faced such an unexpected tragedy of royal massacre. The culture of Royal Palace and the Royal family could be blamed to some extent for the tragic event; but the hypocritically loyal high officials of the royal palace who are responsible for nurturing ill practices and culture for the personal motive to exercise their own authority and power are more to be blamed. To be more specific those few senior officials with some exception - who were responsible for the safety and security of the King and the family and were in power for many years are to be blamed most and can be called the main culprits. They again are some of the main actors behind the screen responsible for bringing the dooms day to the institution of monarchism and the erstwhile king Gyandra.
In the context of royal massacre the loyalty of the Army towards the institution of monarchism and their role to abort the possible royal massacre can not be questioned for the simple reason that - the mandate and the role and responsibility of about 2000 strong army inside the palace premise does not allow their direct involvement in the safety and security of the King and the family and specially in their private events or parties. But the statement made "Army is not responsible for the safety and security of the Royal family" by the then chief of the Army Staff can be taken seriously as an irresponsible remark from such position of authority though the message inside has some meaning; but the statement has come with a wrong tone.
There exist a bit of illusion and false allegation to the army about their loyalty towards the institution of monarchism and the king. If we look behind the history of Nepal Army - its loyalty had always been towards the legal ruler (accepted or enforced) or the legally/constitutionally established government. A big question - was the Panchayat system of rule after the royal coup of democratically elected government was legal? This is the subject of political debate and analysis and beyond the scope of this article. Through out its' history the Nepal Army has served and defended the government in power with no political inclination - it did serve the first democratic government which was established in 1950 after throwing the family rule of Rana. Though the absolute domination of Rana's in higher leaderships of the army did exist but the loyalty of the army did shift toward the ruling government and the democratic leader the king Tribhuban. Over the time Nepal Army became Royal Nepal Army and again the Royal Nepalese Army and the army remained loyal to the government and the constitutionally granted supreme commander the King.
The role and loyalty of then Royal Nepalese Army during the people's movement of 1990; and after the democratic transition of the successful people's movement need to be scrutinized very closely. This may give some direction for the likely stand or role the Nepal Army may take in future to come. The army could have been misused to neutralize the people's movement of 1990; but the patriotic stand taken by the late king Birendara and his decision to submit his power before the people of Nepal rather than bowing down before the neighboring country's condition to preserve his power was very admirable. The constitution of 1991 made a provision of constitutional monarchism and made the king as a constitutional head of state and the supreme commander of the Royal Nepalese Army. The army did try to be loyal to the constitutionally elected government and at the same time preserving its' patronage toward the king. There was a confusion and problem in confidence between the political parties and the army regarding the issue of their loyalty. The democratic government did never try to consolidate and win the confidence and loyalty of the army; rather their unwarranted move to discriminate and diminish the role and existence of army has slowly alienated the army. The standard ill practice of post world war new democratic government - to minimize the role and existence of armed forces in the name of civilian supremacy came into being in Nepal as well. Because of this very psyche India had lost the war with China in 1961 and had to face the major national humiliation. The lack of consistency in the government policy and bias and discriminative attitude toward the army forced the RNA to remain in dilemma in preserving its professional loyalty.
Then came the Maoist problem - the politically biased attitude towards the army and the paramount personal interest of government top leaders and leaders of some security institution compromised the whole ethics of security; which in turn provided an opportunity to the Maoist rebel to turn into a potent and formidable insurgent force. The political biased attitude and the economic interest did not end there rather it continued and compelled the army to remain in austerity for 10 years. The army was deprived from their basic requirements like clothing, boots and equipments for more than 10 years so much so they were even discouraged from the fundamentals of motivation and moral - This is what I call a decade of deprived army; and the army really did not get a reliable guardianship and a patronage. Then the army's dilemma took a shape of acceptance regarding the question of loyalty i.e. where its loyalty should lie. When it come the question of loyalty toward an individual - it will be toward the King and the institution of monarchism; and when it comes the question of loyalty toward an organization it will remain to the government in power; but the loyalty toward the nation and the people was unshakable and committed. There were severing lacks of confidence building efforts from the government side and other quarter of the society as well as from the army itself. The transition period was just right an opportunity and environment for the democratic government to take the charge of the army but the government just did not take the army in confidence or could not win the confidence of the army and in turn failed to take full charge of it.
The unhealthy political environment of that time and the struggle to cling to power tried to use the army to a single party's interest without building consensus with other parties. The political parties did never consider the Maoist problem as the national problem and could not develop a vision and plan of action on how to deal with it. The army tried to win the confidence of the political parties and gain support from the government but in vain; and this brought the army closer to its patron and supreme commander the King for the protection of its interest. The king slowly became more powerful and could impose its conditions upon the political parties but did not/could not dictate conditions for the betterment of the army. The king insisted on building a consensus among the political parties for the mobilization of the army against the Maoist - which did not happen and that was good for the Maoist.
The most unthinkable event of royal massacre took place. Since the consensus among the political parties in the past could not be achieved - the army was not mentally prepared to fight the Maoist for the reason that the political problem has to be or will be resolved through the political means; but the army was dragged to fighting after the Maoist attacked the Army barrack in Dang. The dimension of civil war became heavy and a lot of human and collateral damages the nation suffered. The army was fighting the Maoist with an aim to force them to bring to the political mainstream but did not have a clear Goal to defeat them. They were fighting under the leadership of weak government without clear vision and direction in resolving the problem. The battle situation has reached to a state of stalemate and the environment of protracted civil war loomed in the horizon. Then came the royal coup by the erstwhile king Gyanendra and the king took charge as the executive head of the government; and a kind of semi-military rule was exercised without much success. The army was fighting the Maoist with confused and dual loyalty i.e. the obligatory loyalty toward the people without the support of major political parties and the people alike and loyalty toward the government of own supreme commander. In real term that was the period the army was actually fighting for its own existence with no other option left but without any support from other quarters of the society. The opportunity and environment for political maneuver was just right and the major political parties teamed together with the Maoist and formed a political alliance to fight the royal government and started the people movement. Then the much applauded and made believe loyalty toward the king turned out to be hypocrisy and the king was forced to give away with all his power and ultimately Nepal became republic and the erstwhile king was forced out from the Narayenhiti Palace ending Shah Dynasty rule of about 400 years.
In fact if we look deeply and analyze the socio-psychology of the army as an institution this becomes clear that the institution had always maintained a loyalty of convenience and not a loyalty of commitment toward the king and the monarchism. RNA's so called unshakable loyalty for the king and toward the institution of monarchism just turned out to be a loyalty of convenience and not the loyalty of commitment in time of need. It failed the test of the time because it lacked commitment.
One pathetic reality is that our general mass, the people and the elites in particular failed to understand the importance and the value of RNA. Those who are align to and support the Maoist may or may not agree; but rest of the people must realize the fact that - because of the presence of the RNA as a formidable force, the Maoist could not overrun the government and march freely in capital to seize the sheath of power which otherwise would have happened long time before. None of the political parties and the government instrument could have stopped them from taking over the power; and no one could have predicted the consequence of such takeover- good, bad or for worse. But the RNA deserves this credit for not allowing such unwarranted event to happen by creating a formidable security environment which forced the Maoist to come to understanding with other political parties for achieving their immediate goal. Hence the mass in general and the elites in particular need to be rational while giving their opinion and in making judgments about the role and the contribution of the Army; it will be unfair and unjust towards the institution to impose some cheap allegation like – salami, malami and gulami as their role. They should not forget the reasonably comfortable life they have spent in the urban areas during the civil war period and that was made possible just because the security forces were fighting for the protection of the people – accepting and not accepting this fact is free for all but sensible judgment is demanded.
Now the army is in a position that it can and must maintain its neutral and an apolitical posture. Its loyalty is devoted without question to the people and the nation; and will serve under the constitutionally formed government. As the most important element of national power this institution has obligation to protect the vital interests and other important interests of the nation, protect the people's right and their wellbeing and protect its own interest and existence as well. If this institution is pushed and cornered badly for irrational political interest and forced to compromise its fundamental ethics then this institution though not willingly may even react against such move. If such situation ever comes it will not be sustainable though but definitely will be disastrous to the Nepalese interest.
What is most important issue of today is to build confidence among the Maoist led government, the Maoist party and the Nepal Army. The cold relations between the Maoist leaders and the Army must be brought to an end. The misunderstanding and distrust need to be shorted out and major difference has to be ironed out to smooth the relation. This call for the proactive informal initiatives - particularly some aggressive and pragmatic Track – II initiatives led by the experts and specialist and by few trusted personalities for both parties of conflict. This also must be a subject of major concern to both the parties of conflict and they both have a major obligation to the people and the nation to provide a smooth transition for development. The following are the some of the important impediments for the confidence building effort:
Personal and Institutional ego.
Acute crisis of confidence and distrust between the two parties.
Lack of flexibility in protecting own interests.
Lack of compromising attitude.
Brooding plan of action in stand alone/isolated mode and reluctance to come closer for discussion on the issues.
None identification of acceptable personality and expert to initiate the informal initiative.
This is where the informal initiatives and particularly the Track-II initiative become very important. It is a realized fact by both parties that they need to come to some sorts of understanding and do not deny the need for some kind of amicable compromise. As a part of formal initiative the Army had invited the Prime Minister, Defense minister, Minister of Finance and other important officials to the army HQ and had briefed them on various issues and plans of the Army. But the program terminated without generating any productive enthusiasm; rather ended with a cold response by refusal to attended the proposed interaction session and refreshment arranged in their honor. The refusal by the Defense minister to grace the officer's cadet graduation and passing out ceremony in Kharipati - Military Academy was another note of cold response by the Maoist leader toward the Army, but who looses most - the Maoist themselves. The Maoist need to develop a culture of accepting complements and reciprocating complements, and those kind of opportunities whenever and where come across both parties should capitalize such events as an opportunities to build confidence. These attitudes of negation need to be changed, a basic culture of extending courtesy need to be learned and a productive engagement has to be maintained. The conflicting attitude widens the gap but the accommodative attitude bridge the gap and breaches the misunderstanding. No single political parties or institutions can bring any positive and productive change through their isolated effort rather a synergy can easily be developed if worked together. As it is said - without friction one does not get polished and is equally true being and working together - the sharp edges of misunderstanding gets smoother. The attendance by the President, Prim minister and other members of the executive body in the "Phulpati" ceremony of "Dasain" is a very welcoming step from the government and the Maoist party in Particular. This definitely will help to develop the confidence between the Army and the Maoist led government and in mending the cold relations of the past.
It is strongly believed that the Maoist leaders are seeking advice from few wrong and so called expert group of people; and are negatively fed and influenced on issues and information related to the Nepal army and integration issues. Few genuine experts whomsoever Maoist have contacted did show their willingness to provide their expert opinion and suggestion but without being branded as the Maoist; on the other hand the Maoist leadership wanted to tag them first as their member and then to seek their advice – it is pity for the good cause. They better verify the credibility and competencies of the people they are seeking advice from; it would even be better if they could find some neutral personalities who are knowledgeable on the subject and issues and if possible acceptable to the Nepal Army as well. Hence it will be appropriate to start and strengthen the civil-military relations and actively pursue the informal initiatives with an aim to enhance the confidence building measure.
Published in Kathmandu Post on 08 Dec 2008
