Civil Military Relations in Democratic Transition of Nepal

Background

One of the most talked and argued issues of politics in present Nepal is the issue of civilian supremacy. It is an issue which has raised/drawn a lot of arguments but has remained a subject least discussed and debated. The issues (round table conference, constitutional assembly, federalism, issues of equal representation based on regional, racial, linguistic, classism, dalits and deprived, janajati, women and alike) raised by the Maoist party in the past have been realized and is in the process of political and social internalization and materialization. But the recently raised issue of civilian supremacy is yet to be internalized and materialized. This has become a bone of contention among the parties and a stumbling block for consensus building on major issues of peace process and constitution drafting- the national mandates. There is also a greater concern about even losing of people’s sovereignty and public supremacy in the name of civilian supremacy.

This paper hence makes an endeavor to discuss the Civil Military Relations in general and Civil Military Relations of Nepal in particular. A special focus on civilian supremacy and civilian control based on few case studies of Nepal will be the core subject of discussion.

CHAPTER I

Introduction

The history of civil-military relations can be traced back from the writings of Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz. The seminal books on the subject published by Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz have effectively brought civil-military relations into academia. CMR now has emerged as an important topic of study for students of international relations, comparative politics, and military sociologists.

After the World Wars, CMR got more prominence. The relations were mostly influenced and dominated in the ideological line particularly in the third world counties and in the democratic norms in the developed countries.

Since the end of the cold war, changes in this area have been even more acute, and a paradigm shift in the way of understanding has emerged. Increase of non-state actors has changed the nature of war (war in terrorism), drugs and crimes, and quelling domestic unrest. This has changed the nature of CMR and more need for civil-military partnership has emerged.

Civil-Military Relations (CMR) may be defined as the dynamic formal institutions and informal relationships between ruling elite, military elite, and society in general, based on internal and external social, political, economic, and military variables.[1]

Civil-Military Relations (CMR) is described as the relationship between civil society as a whole and the military organization; but it is narrowly understood as the relationship between the civil authority of a given society and its military authority.

While discussing the CMR one has to understand the Military as the soldier, the army; and the armed forces as distinct from police or civilians. Armed forces are comprised of land force, navy, air force and marine; and in our context this is only the Nepal Army.

Militaries often function as societies within societies. The relationship between the military and the society it serves is a complicated and ever-evolving one. It depends upon the nature of the society as such whether it views the military as important element of national power in time of threat or war, or sees as burdensome and expensive typified by defence cuts in times of peace; and it is generally so.

In the modern era, enormous social changes have been brought, and military power continues to dominate international relations. The role of the military today is as central to global societies as it ever was.

CMR is a dynamic component of government of governance. CMRs are based on the social dynamics between the variables namely the civilian and the military. In society there are two variables namely civilian and the military and their social dynamics forms the basis of Civil-military relations. If the relationship between these two variables could be managed well in the existing social structure and dynamics of psychology, philosophy, culture and politics, it will provide a wonderful service to the country and the people.

CMR has to be looked and understood in the backdrop of the time period as their definitions and dimensions have changed with time in different centuries.

3/4th of the countries in post WW- II Asia had military government. [1] With the dynamic changes in the world like the end of cold war, fall of Soviet Union and communism, and rise of democratic regimes the dimension of CMR has also changed. There are also resurgence of communist rule in some of the Latin American countries. [2] Nepal in democratic transition experiences a strong existence of communist party the United Communist Party Maobadi (UCPM) which is trying to define the CMR in terms of Civilian supremacy, but in their own way.

Chapter II

Theories

1. Institutional theory

Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz, both have argued that military organizations were primarily the servants of the state. Samuel P. Huntington in his book "Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations" [3] has described about the Varieties of Civilian Control. The concept of "civilian control" has never been satisfactorily defined. It may have something to do with relative power of civilian and military; or it may be such that the civilian control is achieved to the extent that the power of military groups is reduced. In this regard Huntington has presented two broad answers.

Huntington categorized the two worlds as the civilian and military worlds. He described the differences between them as a contrast between the attitudes and values held by military personnel, mostly conservative, and those held by civilians, mostly liberal. Huntington’s answer to control dilemma to ensure the liberal civilian world dominance over the military world was the “military professionalism”, in other term the “objective civilian control.” This was in contrast to “subjective control,” in which direction would be more intrusive and detailed.

Subjective Civilian Control: Maximizing Civilian Power.

The simplest way to minimize the military power will be to maximize the power of civilian groups in relation to military. The large number of civilian groups with varied character, and conflicting interests, however, make it difficult if not impossible to maximize their power as a whole with respect to military. This is equally true in Nepalese context since the restoration of democracy in BS 2047 till date. The large numbers of civilian groups in Nepal are the political parties and various power group/groups or the stakeholders of the changes. In the process the consequences are usually the maximizing the power of the some particular group or groups - like the king and his circle, political leaders and the parties in government, but all in the name of maximizing of civilian power. This is what Huntington called the subjective civilian control.

Subjective civilian control involves the power relations among civilian groups. Power relations are usually advanced by one civilian group as a means to enhance its power at the expense of other civilian group. Subjective civilian control became an instrumental slogan like "state's right" rather than an end in itself. The slogan of "civilian control" is utilized by some group which lack power over the military forces in the struggle with other civilian group. This has happened in Nepal during the Maoist party led government in recent past. Though the Maoist party have their own army (presently in the cantonments), it is lacking in the capacity to bring about paradigm shift in overall power balance with the state force.

Huntington argues that like "states' rights" the civilian control may cover a variety of sins, and questions while civilian do the controlling. In its historical manifestations, the subjective civilian control has been known to maximize the power of - particular government institutions, particular social class and particular constitutional forms.

1. Civilian Control by Government Institutions:

In 17th and 18th century, in England and America, the military force were generally under the control of the crown, just like Nepal had till recent past. The parliamentary groups then adopted a slogan "Civilian Control" as a means to increase their power vis-à-vis the crown, so as to maximize parliamentary control over the armed forces rather than the civilian control in general. Then the parliamentary control was sought:

· Not as a means to curtailing the power of military, but

· As a way to curtailing the power of the king.

So has happened in Nepal in its' democratic transition, and somewhat similar practice was tried after the restoration of democracy in BS 2007.

2. Civilian Control by Social Class:

European aristocracy and bourgeoisie tried to control the military in 18th and 19th century, and tried to establish their own interest in the name of civilian control over the military. So have the aristocracy and bourgeoisie of Nepal (Shaha, Rana, Thapa, Pandey and Basnyat) during 19th and 20th century tried to control the military, though not in the name of civilian control.

3. Civilian Control by Constitutional Form:

One dimension of civilian control with particular civilian interest occurs when a claim is made such that only a specific constitutional form- usually democracy can ensure civilian control. It further identifies:

· Civilian control occur with democratic government

· Military control occurs with absolute or totalitarian government.

While relating the above in Nepalese context the first case might have been applicable while most of the party governments were in office. This has not happened in real term since the exercise of civilian control did not take place the way it should have taken place. The second case could have been applicable exclusively in case of Maoist party government but with absolute majority if at all the party could achieve.

Some generalization has been done that the military will be more powerful in totalitarian countries than in democratic countries. But there are examples that even in democratic countries, the military may undermine civilian control and acquire great political power through the legitimate process and institutions of democratic government and politics. This has happened in our region such as in Pakistan and Bangladesh in recent past. Many more similar examples could be cited in Asia-Pacific and African nations.

In totalitarian regime, on the other hand the power of military may also be reduced by:

· Breaking the offices corps into competing units

· Establishing the party army (like the Maoist army of Nepal) and special military force

· Infiltrating the military hierarchy with political commissars, and

· Using similar other techniques

In totalitarian regime terror, conspiracy, surveillance, and the use of force are the means used by the civilian to control their armed forces. When these means are employed most ruthlessly this may virtually eliminate military political power. This has happed in Germany in World War II.

With changes the problems of civil- military relations have been transformed with the rise of military professionalism. These transformations have complicated the civilian groups' efforts to maximize their power over the military. Such civilian groups are now confronted with:

· Other civilian groups with similar goals, and

· New independent, functional military imperatives.

The rise of military professionalism make some particular form of subjective civilian control obsolete and at the same time made possible for a new and more meaningful definition of civilian control.

Objective Civilian Control: Maximizing Military professionalism

Huntington has advanced the theory of objective civilian control which in objective sense is maximizing the military professionalism. In more precise form it is the distribution of political power between the military and civilian groups which will be most conducive for the development of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officers' corps.

Subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military whereas objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military - making military aware, responsible and accountable. First case tries to project military as the mirror of the state and second case makes military tool of the state. There are variety of forms exist in subjective civilian control as have been described above, but the objective civilian control have only one form. The essence of objective civilian control and subjective civilian control lies on the fact that the first recognizes the autonomous military professionalism i.e. politically aware but professionally responsible and accountable military and second denies the independent military sphere. So the demand for the first system of control has come from military profession and second system of control from multifarious civilian groups.

But, the basis and most essential for any system of civilian control are to minimize the power of military; and the objective civilian control achieves this by:

· Professionalizing the military.

· Rendering military politically sterile and neutral.

· At the same time preserving the essential elements of power necessary for existence of military profession.

On the issue of preserving the essential element of power the subjective civilian control presupposes a conflict between civilian control and the needs of military security, such as:

· Continued military insecurity makes civilian control impossible.

· Effort to enhance the civilian control frequently undermine the military security.

While defining the civilian control in objective sense there exist no conflict between it and the goal of military security.

While making an overall assessment it could be concluded that in US and western Europe - with the emergence of military profession there are achievements made by the objective civilian control where as the subjective civilian control is fundamentally out of place. However the tendencies of many civilian groups and their inclination in subjective civilian control still continue to insist upon subordination of officer corps to their own interest and principle. Hence the high level of objective civilian control is a rare phenomenon even among the modern western society.

Maximizing the military professionalism and the objective civilian control depends upon the relations between the two levels of civil-military relations.

1. Power level: the key issue is the power of the officers' corps relative to civilian groups within society.

2. Ideological level: the key issue is the compatibility of the professional military ethic with the political ideologies prevailing in society.

Thus, maximization of military professionalism and objective control through the distribution of power between civilian and military group varies with the compatibility between the ideology prevailing in society and the professional military ethic. Hence, the objective civilian control depends upon the achievement of an appropriate equilibrium between the power of the military and the ideology of society.

Patterns of Civil-Military Relations

There are five different ideal types of CMR based on the relations among power, professionalism, and ideology. In actual practice the CMR of any society combines elements of two or more of the five types.

1. Antimilitary ideology, high military political power, and low military professionalism

Generally found

· in more primitive countries where military professionalism has been retarded; or

· in more advanced countries when security threats are suddenly intensified and military rapidly increase their political power.

CMR of this type tended to prevail in countries of near East, Asia, and Latin America. Turkey removed their officers from politics and cultivated professional behavior and outlook. Indonesia has high military political power. Japan has maintained this pattern of CMR over a long period of time. It was also the characteristics of Germany during World War I and United States in World War II.

Antimilitary ideology though not directly but in subtle form prevailed throughout the period of democratic transition in Nepal. This was intense during Panchayet period and became more intense after the establishment of democracy in BS 2046.

2. Antimilitary ideology, low military political power, and low military professionalism

Generally appears where

· Ideology of society is intensely pursued

· Political power of military has reduced

Modern totalitarian states may tend towards this type of CMR. A close approximation of CMR existed in Germany during World War II. India during Neharu leadership and Nepal during panchayet period could be some close example in South Asia.

3. Antimilitary ideology, low military political power, and high military professionalism

This type of CMR is likely to have

· In a society which suffers few threat to its security

United States after the civil war until the beginning of World War II could be an example. Excluding the antimilitary ideology India could be another example.

4. Pro-military ideology, high military political power, and high military professionalism

A high level of military political power still maintaining the military professionalism and objective civilian control may prevail

· In a society with continuing security threat, and

· In a society with an ideology sympathetic to military value

An outstanding achieving was made by Prussia and Germany during Bismarckian-Moltkean epoch (1860-1890). Israel could be another example.

This may be possible in some of the totalitarian society and communist rule, and North Korea could be an example.

5. Pro-military ideology, low military political power, and high military professionalism

This type of CMR may prevail in a society

· Relatively safe from the security threat

· Dominated by conservative or other ideology sympathetic to the military view point

This type of CMR to some extent existed in the Twentieth-century Britain. Modern powerful countries have this type of CMR minus pro-military ideology

2. Convergence theory

The other principal within the civil-military was generated in 1960 by Morris Janowitz in The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. [5] Janowitz introduced a theory of convergence which postulated either a civilianization of the military or a militarization of society. Despite this convergence, Janowitz believes that the military world will retain certain essential differences from the civilian remaining recognizably military in nature.

Military Influence on Policy Making and the Duty of Political Neutrality

In military profession, Jonowitz analyzes the military mission includes three functions

1. Representative

2. Advisory

3. Executive

The first two at least leave some room for the military officers to influence policy rejecting the principle of noninvolvement of military to attempt to influence the policy.

Janowitz agrees with Huntington on fundamental differences between the civilian and military worlds. He argues that because of differences, clashes would develop which would diminish the goal of civilian control of the military. His answer was to ensure convergence, thus the military world would be inspired with the norms and expectations of the society that created it.

He specifically encourages for the broader influences of society within the military culture. He argues that broader the influences, smaller the attitudinal differences between the two worlds and the greater the chance of civilians maintaining control over the military. Janowitz and Huntington both believed that the civilian and military worlds were different from one another; while Huntington developed a theory to control the difference, Janowitz developed a theory to diminish the difference.

Janowitz concluded and recommended constabulary concept as a new military self-conception in American history. When the military is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory the military establishment becomes a constabulary force. Under this new concept the role of the civilian elite would be to interact closely with the military elite so as to ensure a new and higher standard of professional military education. This would ensure the military professionals more closely attuned to the ideals and norms of civilian society.

Here it will be worthwhile to mention the observation made by Eliot A. Cohen in his review for Huntington, the tension between the soldier and the statesman is rooted in the essence of professionalism, and prescribed "objective control" as the optimum form of CMR. This form of civilian control achieves its objective by maximizing the professionalism of the officer corps and by including its autonomy within a clearly defined military sphere. Janowitz, the founder of American military sociology agrees that officership has undergone a fundamental transition to a "constabulary" model, increasing resemblance to police forces. Constabularies organize and apply violence in tightly controlled and limited circumstances and retain close links with the society they protect. [3]

3. Current Theory

The current civil-military theory whose centre piece is the separation between civilian and military institutions was popular in the 1950s and 1960s. During this period many nations underwent transformation due to military intervention in domestic politics. Because of these potential threats to the democracy, the American theoretical and empirical approach was devised to influence the civil-military relations abroad. This approach known as "current theory" emphasize the separation between "civil" and "military" institutions; thus detaching the professional military from political ambitions, and leaving no reason to intervene in the sphere of civilian institutions for any special political causes. This separation requires a distinct set of civilian institutions that can maintain control over the armed forces and armed forces are not involved in the political decision making process.

Firstly, this theory is historically and culturally bound to American case, and the military insularity, political neutrality, and conservative defence planning were its standards. Then this standard became a model and exported to nations that had standards, histories, and cultures of professionalism quite different from the western norms, and did not work the way it was perceived. American writer Luis Smith in 1951 observed that the constitutional process and the public mind, which harbors specific political and cultural values, must work hand in hand to enable the most effective relationship between political institutions, the military, and the citizenry. This argument does not support the separation approach and is not necessarily applicable in other political cultures with different history and culture.

Secondly, the institutional emphasis of the current theory, which advocates for the separation of civil and military institutions, neglects the issues of culture elsewhere other than the American history and culture. But the institutional separation is the cultural norm that is embedded in the current theory. Depending upon the culture, history, and politics of a particular nation, civil-military relations may involve separation, integration, or variety of other forms. Although the civilian and military institutions are the important elements of CMR, the current theory fails to consider the important influence of civilian society and culture. The cultural factors include the norms and values, attitudes and symbols which indicates not only the nation's view of its military but also the military's own view on their role. The case study of Israel and India amply explains the influence of these factors and these influences could make the basis for the absence or prevalence of domestic military intervention.

The two type of case study reveal the shortcomings of the current theory of civil-military separations; contradicting both the predictions of intervention and non-intervention.

4. Concordance Theory

After observing most of the civil-military theory that assumes the civilian and military worlds must necessarily be separate, both physically and ideologically, Rebecca L. Schiff offered a new theory of Concordance as an alternative theory. One of the key questions in Civil-Military Relations theory has always been to determine under what conditions the military will intervene in the domestic politics of the nation.

In this theory Schiff deals with the possibility and conditions under which the military intervention may promote or inhibit domestic military intervention. Contrary to the Current Theory, the Concordance Theory as an alternative theory proposes and argues that the three partners - military, the political elites and the citizenry should aim for cooperative relationship that may or may not entail the separation of political and military institutions. In other word it sees that there is a need for a high level of integration between the military and other parts of the society. As a descriptive and prescriptive theory, concordance theory does not limit itself to one civil-military scenario, and it explains the institutional and cultural conditions that affect the distinctive relationships among the three partners. Concordance does not preclude the separation of civilian institutions and control of the military.

By contrast to the current theory the concordance theory highlights dialogue, accommodation, and shared values or objectives among the military, the political elites, and the society- known as three partners. The three partners can simply be understood as:

1. The Military

· Armed forces and the personnel

2. The political leadership

· Can best be defined in terms of function and cabinets, presidents, prime ministers, party leaders, parliaments, and monarchies are all possible form of governmental elites

3. The citizenry

· Is best defined by function- How do they interact with the military?; Is there agreement among the citizens themselves over the role of the military in society?. The current theory does not consider citizenry but relies on political institution as the main "civil" component.

The result of concordance among the three partners achieves two goals:

· Firstly; it explains which institutional and cultural conditions involving separation, integration, or other alternative - prevent or promote domestic military intervention.

· Secondly; it predicts that when an agreement prevails among the three partners, domestic military intervention is less likely to occur.

Here the concordance among the three partners indicates the concordance on four indicators. The four indicators are - composition of officer corps, political decision- making process, recruitment method, and the military style. The four indicators can simply be understood as:

1. Composition of officer corps - career soldiers, in charge of broad institutional and day to day functioning, as leaders provide critical links between citizenry and military also between military and government. In democratic societies the composition usually represents the various constituencies, but broad representation is not the requisite for concordance as the society and the military could agree on a less broadly representative corps

2. Political decision-making process - involves institutional organ of society that determine important factors for the military: budget, materials, size, and structure. It does not imply a particular form of government: democratic, authoritarian or any other- rather refers to the specific channels that determine the needs and allocations of the military. In some country there is close partnership or collusion between the military and the industry known as "military industrial complex", and agreement occur among the three partners over the political process that best meets the needs and requirements of the armed forces

3. Recruitment method - the method of enlistment of citizen into the armed forces may be coercive or persuasive. Coercive recruitment refers to forcible conscription of men and supplies for military, whereas persuasive recruitment can take the form either voluntary or involuntary enlistment (example of Sri-lanka); and implies an agreement among the three partners over the requirements of composition of the armed forces.

4. Military style - refers to external manifestations of the military and the inner mental construction associated with it: its look, its ethos, and people. Style is so important that it draws or eliminate the social boundaries. Military style deals directly with the human and cultural elements of the armed forces. The uniform, rituals, traditions and ceremonies represent some of the styles.

Concordance theory looks differently and resolves the two problems associated with Current theory of separation. Firstly, Current theory is largely derived from the experience of United States of American and is grounded with its historical and cultural perspective which may be inapplicable in other nations. On the other hand Concordance theory considers unique historical and cultural experience of nations and various other possibilities for CMR which may be different from American example. Secondly, Current theory of separation based on the institutional analysis fails to take into account the cultural and historical conditions that may encourage or discourage civil-military institutional separation. Concordance not only makes institutional analyses but also addresses the issues relevant to a nation's culture. If we look at the current international events, the domestic unrests now found throughout the world are in mostly based on the ethnic orientation and issue of multicultural diversity. Concordance theory makes a pragmatic analysis of specific institutional and cultural indicators and explains the empirical conditions under which the military, the government and the society may agree on separate, integrated, or other form of CMR in order to prevent domestic intervention.

Concordance theory relates military role in domestic sphere that includes the government and the society; but does not require a particular form of government, set of institutions, or decision -making process. Concordance usually takes place in the context of active agreement - either established by legislation, decree, constitution, or based on the long standing historical and cultural values. In contrast to current theory of separation, concordance encourages cooperation and involvement among the military, the political institutions, and the society at large. Concordance does not assume that a separation of the military and the civilian institutions is required to prevent the domestic military intervention. Rather it argues that it may be avoided if the military cooperates with the political elites and the citizenry. When the three partners agree about the role of the military by achieving a mutual accommodation, domestic interventions are less likely to occur in a particular state.

Both the current theory of civil-military separation and the new theory of concordance are descriptive as well as prescriptive. Separation theory describes the separation of civil and military institutions found in America and prescribes this theory as the best deterrent to domestic military intervention for their wide range of cultural difference. Concordance theory describes a concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry in a wide range of cultures and substantial agreement among all sectors of society about the role of armed forces. It prescribes its flexible application to all cultures different from each other and from United States and as a deterrent to domestic military intervention.

Two case studies of Israel and India; where domestic military intervention has never occurred, illustrate the merit of concordance theory while challenging the current theory. Here concordance explains institutional and cultural conditions that affect the distinctive relationships among the three partners; whereas current theory assumes separation of military from political institutions. Furthermore, concordance has predictive power i.e. if the three partners agree on four indicators then domestic intervention is less likely to occur.

Israel

According to prevailing theory (high threat- powerful military institution-weak civilian authority-potential military intervention), Israel, as a nation under high external threat conditions with a powerful and active military, is a prime candidate for domestic military intervention, but she has never experienced any domestic military intervention. The persistent climate of war and terrorism has decisively shaped the relationship among the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), Israeli political institutions, and Society. The IDF's influence on government, industry, and the ethos of Israel people illustrate how CMR cannot always be discussed on the basis of well developed "civil" or "civilian" spheres separate from the army. As a result of removal of boundaries dividing the military, the political institutions, and the citizenry, Israel can be characterized as an "uncivil state"; the civil military separation that define many western European and American nations are absent in Israeli case.

Despite the lack of civil-military separation, Israel has achieved agreement and co-operation among the three partners and four indicators of concordance.

First: The Israeli officers' corps professionalism is characterized by an intimate and informal Israeli culture. The corps is not a separate and exclusionary institution, but a group of elite soldiers who sustains the citizens' army largely by maintaining the respect and trust of the citizen soldiers.

Second: the broad recruitment patterns of IDF are largely responsible and recruitment outside the corps does not alienate any one sector of the society. The recruitment process is involuntary yet persuasive. Israel cannot mobilize without its part-time citizen soldiers, and Israel society is well represented within the ranks and files of the army, navy and air force.

Third: with respect to political decision-making, Israel has always claimed to have a government represented by civilians and quite separate from the military. Institutional mechanisms for defining civilian and military roles in security were never implemented in Knesset (the Israeli parliament). In the early years of Ben Gurion's (prime minister and defence minster) time the army in fact was "mainly subordinate to him". With the dramatic change in political need of the nation since Ben Gurion's days, there remains substantial ambiguity about the relative power of the prime minister, minister of defence, and chief of staff. Rules are often made to define the scope of military authority, and changes were made depending on the particular governmental cabinet. All this exercise precludes the possibility of a distinct and well regulated civilian authority that controls the military.

Fourth: the absence of regulation which otherwise is found in civilian control over the military is also reflected in Israeli military style. The often sloppy and unkempt appearances of the uniform reflect the easy interchangeability between citizen and soldier. The informal appearances of Israeli uniform breaks down the traditional boundaries and reflect prevalence of general informality in Israeli society.

India

The British legacy of military professionalism and related subordination of the Indian armed forces to civil institutional control are often presented as major reason for the prevention of domestic military intervention in India - setting examples supporting the current theory of "civilian control". But in Israeli the elimination of civilian and military boundaries have challenged the theory of civil control. Over the past decades the Indian political system has undergone several but significant changes, and that have at times led the central government to be weak. Many of these changes were prompted by domestic social violence, economic problems and dispute with the neighbors. The military has adopted this political transformation even though these have led to weakened political center which otherwise could have been an opportune time for domestic military intervention. A major reason for this adjustment is that Indian political development is not limited strictly to an institutional relationship but with a strong political center. From independence days the military as an institution and in conjunction with civilian authority has groomed Indian soldiers to adapt to the changing political and cultural landscape of Indian society. This process has nurtured agreement among military, the political elites, and the citizenry about the role and function of the armed forces of India. This is the long-term concordance and not the separation that has enabled the military to meet the challenges of critical stages in Indian state-building. For many years after independence the Indian officer corps incorporated the style and selective recruitment of the British. But since 1980 the corps has more middle class origins, from a greater diversity of regions and caste making far more representation of Indian society. This became the corner stone of the ethic and social composition of the officer corps and is becoming more inclusive in nature than before. Indian military recruitment within the ranks and file is voluntary and persuasive - motivated by patriotism, loyalty, monetary remuneration and quality living conditions, as well as an internationally respected institution. A definite process for political decision-making has emerged during Indian state-building: a three tier committee system was established which consist of Defence Committee of Cabinet (DCC), now called the Political Affairs Committee (PAC), the Defence Minister's Committee, and the Chief of Staff Committee (CSC). Consequently the civilian component of the three-tier system has maintained control over the armed forces, largely because the military has accepted civil control.

When analyzing the reason for no military intervention in Indian context; the civilian control over the military cannot be the single explanation. Civil control theory concerns only the institutional mechanisms controlling the relationship between the civilian government and the armed forces. The Indian civil-military relations in terms of concordance among the military, the political elites, and the citizenry about the role and function of the armed forces can best be understood on true complexity of Indian CMR. The composition of the Indian officer corps, the military's conscription method, and the military style, in conjunction with the current political decision-making process are essential parts to understand the CMR in India. This also draws the attention to the importance of specific culture, and institutional context such as religion, cast, language, and domestic conflict.

These two case studies demonstrate how the current theory failed to explain particular examples of relationship among the three partners. The historical and cultural condition prevailing in Israel and India are distinctive and they bear significance on the way in which military views its role in these nations. The IDF are largely a product of indigenous Jewish culture whereas India integrated British colonial history into its rich native culture. In these two cases study concordance has been achieved among the military, the political elites, and the society in politically and culturally distinctive ways. The active and enduring agreement among the three partners in these countries can better explain than current theory for non domestic military intervention.

Hence it can be concluded that there existed a long standing assumption in the field of CMR such as:

· There exist a dichotomous power relationship between civil and military spheres.

· Domestic military intervention is prevented if civil institutions are in control and check over a professional military.

· Domestic military intervention is more likely to occur if civilian institutions do not exist or are too weak to control the armed forces.

But the concordance theory challenges these assumptions based on two case studies of India and Israel and also criticizes the current theory of separation which focused on its western-bound, dichotomous, and institutional nature.

"Desch" observed that the end of cold war paradoxically has coincided with a deterioration of CMR in both the US and Russia. CMR in both the countries once considered models of stability, have certainly taken a turn to worse. In his article "Threat Environments and Military Missions" Desch shares agreement with Harold Lasswell's contention that the military's influence should be the highest in challenging international threat environment and lowest in relatively benign one. The end of cold war should have made the civilian easier to exert control over the military establishments.

Different combinations of external and internal threat environment shape the military's "missions" and hence the pattern of CMR. The missions can be either external limited to war fighting or internal such as nonmilitary functions as nation-building, internal security, humanitarian relief, and social-welfare provision. And the result would be

1. External

A state facing traditional external military challenge usually adopts objective control mechanism granting the military substantial autonomy in the narrow military realm in return for complete political loyalty. The threat orients military outward making it less inclined to meddle in domestic politics, and are likely to have stable CMR. (USA case - Firing of Gen Douglas MacArthur, Eisenhower's austere military budget, only a few case of successful military resistance to civilian authority; Soviet case - Slashed the defence budget, significant arms control concessions to the west, allowed reunification of Germany, breakup of Warsaw pact)

2. Internal

When a country is facing internal threat civilian politician often get tempted to bring the military into the domestic political arena. The reason for this could be both to support their particular faction in its struggle against rival groups and to ensure their group's control over the military. This subjective control inevitably leads to unhealthy CMR. Subjective control refers to the effort to control the military by politicizing it which induces the military to adapt an internal orientation thus making inevitable military intervention in politics. This will be the worst pattern of CMR. (Argentina, Brazil and Chile are a disaster for CMR)

3. Combination

A state facing both external and internal treats will experience difficult CMR, though not so bad as a state facing only internal threats. (France)

Political analysts find it difficult to agree upon criteria to characterize as either good or poor CMR. But the author believes that the best way to gauge CMR is to examine how civilian and military leaders handle policy differences between them. The best CMR situation in a country will be such where civil authorities are able to prevail in policy dispute with the military.

The military's mission is best identified by examining its doctrine. A particular military mission is determined largely by the international and domestic security environments that the nation faces.

CHAPTER III

Civil supremacy and Civilian control

The principle of civil supremacy over the military is an important principle of American constitutional government. Kenneth W. Kemp and Charles Hudlin have a different way of looking at the principle from another point of view. They see it as a moral principle applicable to individual officers and soldiers. [6]

According to Kemp and Hudlin - one of the most important principles of Anglo–American system of government is the principle of civil supremacy over the military. They tried to explore the nature and limits of respect for civilian control as a moral obligation of soldiers.

Principle of civil supremacy

The principle of civil supremacy asserts that the military is responsible for protecting the country and not governing it. The military has been consistently and carefully excluded from three responsibilities:

1. Doing routine police work;

2. Running courts; and

3. Making policy i.e. civilian make policy and military implements it

Principle of civilian control

Principle of civilian control advocates that:

1. The ends of the government policy are to be set by civilians, and the military is limited to decision about means. In other words the military are the policy implementers and not the policy makers.

2. It is the civilian leadership to decide where the line between ends and means and hence between civilian and military responsibility is to be drawn.

They defend this two-point principle and discuss its limits by appeal to general philosophical considerations and by reflection on historical examples.

The obligation of Obedience

There are two fundamental aspects on the question of obedience

1. Locus-of-loyalty question: in America the C-in-C principle requires that, in doubtful case, the soldier's obligation is to follow the orders of the President rather than the legislature or the courts.

2. What is the limit to the obligation of obedience? We can classify various kinds of disobedience based on:

a. The action itself

b. The reason for disobedience

Legal and moral reason for disobedience to orders

Based on the legal and moral reason for disobedience to orders; two questions have been considered:

1. The right of disobedience

2. The moral imperative to act without orders

Based on the questions, there are three clear cases of limits on the duty of disobedience:

1. Orders that are illegal

2. Order that violate international law

3. Order that are immoral.

According to the tradition of US Law - soldier is not only excused from obeying illegal orders but is not even permitted to obey them.

If moral imperative sometimes justify refusal to order, but can it provide military officer the right to pursue his objectives that he sees morally imperative which otherwise his civilian superior refuse to approve? For example, to save people from ethnic cleansing; or even more so to refuse to fire at own people in "aid to civil power/democratic government"

Politically motivated disobedience to order

There are many cases of politically motivated violations of civilian control. The most famous case of military disregard for the principle of civilian control is of course the case of Gen McArthur. "An immensely popular hero of World War II, General Douglas MacArthur's public insistence on the need to expand the Korean War (use of atom bomb), over the objections of President Harry Truman, led to the termination of his command".[3] McArthur's resistance to his civilian superiors was motivated by the objective of any nation at war for immediate and complete victory. General Lavelle's secret bombing of North Vietnam is another example. In both the cases Generals have refused to accept the presidential restrictions on how to wage a war; and were convinced that the policies of civilian authorities were illogical and in a way that cost the lives of American servicemen. But there were no supreme emergency and no ground for revolution; they could have simply resigned or requested reassignment.

Charles de Gaulle in France, and his refusal to follow Petain's order that the French should not take up arms against the Germans; and Field Marshall S Manekshaw in India, and his refusal to follow PM Indira Gandhi’s order to launch an offensive against East Pakistan during Monsoon season has been justified for the greater interest of the nation.

The author justifies the de Gaulle case as

· A representation of supreme emergency, in which the normal rules against the military involvement in civilian decision making may be suspended.

· The Vinchy government deserved to be overthrown

The principle of civilian supremacy over the military and the subsidiary principle of civilian control are important features of American system of government. This principle has constitutional feature but has more of an individual moral obligations of officer. The principle advocates that the military not only obey the legal and morally acceptable order of civilian leadership, but also avoid other kind of political involvement. The right to violate the principle arises from the limited nature of duty of disobedience, but such disobedience inherits the special danger of making the civil-government relations perilous.

Chapter IV

Democratic Control of Armed Forces

In DCAF definition "Democratic control of armed forces refers to the norms and standards governing the relationship between the armed forces and society, whereby the armed forces are subordinated to democratically-elected authorities and subject to the oversight of the judiciary as well as the media and civil society organizations - DCAF" [9]

Evolution of the military-society relationship can be seen in order of:

1. Civil-military relations - democratic control of the military - democratic control of all the armed forces - democratic governance of the security sector

2. Under Democratic governance - performance of the military is overseen by democratic parliamentary and judicial institutions, a strong civil society and an independent media. This ensures the military's accountability to both the population and the government, and promotes transparency in its decisions and actions.

There are two main Democratic control paradigms:

One is based on the way control is exercised such as

· Vertical control: exercise of ‘top-down’ influence over the military.

· Horizontal control: informally influencing matters of defence policy through the media and civil society organisations.

· Self-control: actions that the military itself performs to ensure that rules are respected.

Another is based on the timing of the controls

· Proactive control: steps aimed at addressing future problems.

· Reactive control: occurs after decisions have been made and includes review of defence policies or the audit of expenditures.

· Operational control: takes place during military operations and involves a political intervention in the decisions of the military chain of command.

Political journalist Mortan Kondracke's observations (9) on Huntington's "Third Wave" are very interesting to note here:

· Huntington's "third wave" is a 16-year period after 1974 when 30 formerly authoritarian countries became democracies.

· Huntington identified two previous "waves"

o The period from 1828 to 1926, when the United States and 20 other countries established government based on universal suffrage.

o The period from 1943 to 1962, when the allied victory in World War II and the post war process of decolonization converted 20 previous dictatorships into democracies or quasi-democracies

· Huntington at the same time reminds us all that each wave of democratization has been followed by a period of reversal:

o Between 1922 and 1942 the number of democracies in the world fell from 29 to 12

o Between 1962 and 1973, the number of democracies fell from 36 to 30; and the number of non-democracies increased from 75 to 92 as various former colonies and fresh democracies fell to military coups and other form of authoritarian takeovers.

o As of 1990, Huntington calculated 58 democracies in the world and 71 non-democracies.

o In 1990 the percentage of all countries that were democratic was 45- just about exactly what it was in1922.

· Huntington warns that the democracy's advance has been a "two step forward, one step back" process.

· Huntington believed that democracy is the best system, and advised reformers/democrats

o To be prepared for "standpatters (authoritarian reactionaries) to take some extreme action to block the change", such as staging a coup.

o To crackdown the standpatters ruthlessly.

o "Cultivate generals" as a shield and also "practice and preach nonviolence" to win over security forces and troops.

· Huntington has entire series of recommendations for keeping the military on the side of democracy, including increasing their pay.

DCAF

According to Wim F. van Eekelen in his DCAF Occasional Paper the basic notion of democracy is that governments derive their legitimacy from the freely expressed votes of their citizens. But the three main functions of government – legislative, executive and judicial – as defined in Montesquieu’s Trias Politica, seldom resulted in a complete separation of powers. Central government plays a dominant role in foreign affairs and defence fields and democratic control can be exercised only by the national parliament.

In the changing European security environment the goals of modern security policy have become much wider than the traditional tasks of protecting independence and territorial integrity. There is increasing focus on multilateral action such as support of crisis management, the promotion of stability and most recently combating terrorism. Even under these changing circumstances some general guidelines can be and has been drawn for parliamentary control over the defence budget and military equipment decisions.

Parliamentary Control

The army being integrated into society by and large accepted the primacy of politics. Still the differences lies on the perception that - the military feels that the governments did not provide them with the means to carry out the tasks allotted to them; and politicians became increasingly concerned about the use of military power, both in terms of their control over the budget and on moral and legal grounds. (p.5)

The primacy of politics must be maintained and at the same time an adversarial relationship between military and civilian should be avoided. While it is true that the military have to be under democratic control – such as overall security policy, security requirements and the decision to use force, but micromanagement is not a task for politicians. The generals should be held accountable for their conduct within their terms of reference and accept the primacy of democratic politics. A climate of mutual respect, recognition of professional competence and transparent decision-making procedures based on the military as well as political inputs is required for a successful defence policy. While politics will prevail, the military also must feel confident that their views have been taken into consideration.(p.5-6)

Parliamentary Practice in the Field of Security Policy

In the field of foreign affairs and defence, all western parliaments have Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs and Defence - a practice different from the other domains of government activity. The main areas covered by the Parliamentary Defence Committees, depending on the provisions of the constitution and the standing orders of the parliament are: Military doctrines and strategies; Long-term planning of the security sector, including high-level documents.

Democratic Control of Security Policy

On national interest foreign affairs and defence have to interact closely and defence policy should be an integral part of foreign policy. In a crisis involving vital national interest the defence department acquires special powers through the declaration of a state of emergency/a state of siege, which allows it to bypass most of the parliamentary procedures. Nevertheless a parliamentary scrutiny through Parliamentary Defence/security Committees will prevail to decide upon the security policy, legislation, defence planning and defence spending.

CMR in South Asia

It is difficult to claim and explain the rich diversity of forms and the variety of styles of civil-military interactions found in the real world of nations-states. Charles H. Kennedy and David J Loucher have discussed the three conceptual themes which has dominated the social science literature pertaining to civil-military interaction - military professionalism, theories of the coup d'état, and government performance.

The academia has shied away from covering CMR and for many associates CMR has only been a study of military with focus on military interventions in politics. The CMR in Asia has received the attention largely in the context of Third World studies and democratic transition. So is the case of present day's Nepal.

Samuel E. Finer in his book "The Man on Horseback: Military Intervention into Politics" has offered a look into the civil-military relationships in the under-developed world. Finer observed that many governments in under-developed world do not have the administrative skills to efficiently govern which may open opportunities for military to intervene. The increased incidences of military coups d'etat since World War II, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s have brought a growing interest about the CMR. On the principle of civilian control, S.E. Finer asks the question "given the obvious power of the military, the wonder is not why it rebels against its civilian masters, but why it obeys it". [7]

On the military professionalism issue in South Asian nations Ganguly (India), Rizvi (Pakistan), and Baxter/Rahaman (Bangladesh) each has assorted the norms of military professionalism and political neutrality are important to their respective state's military. All the three military as lineal descendent of British Indian Army have highly valued the internalized norms of political loyalty and neutrality. However, with passes of time the experience of the states after the partition has been quite different. India's military, has participated though with reluctance in the "aid to civil" activities, but has stayed aloof from politics. The experience of Pakistan and Bangladesh is quite different. The military's political role in both the states has been pervasive and dominant; though still maintain a strong attachment to the ethos of the liberal model of military involvement in politics. Zia-ur-Rahaman and Ershad regimes attempted to civilianize their rule (Baxter and Rahaman); and similar pattern is found in Ayub and Zia-ul-Haq regimes (Rizvi). But the norms of military professionalism are hard to reconcile with the realities of military rule. (p.1-3)

On the other hand playing politics with the military could be like playing with a double-edges sword as has happened in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

According to Huntington the success factors of new democracy in restructuring Civil-military relations are the growing acceptance of the norms of military professionalism and civil control, the movement of civilian control has been in the interest of both civilians and armed forces and the re-ordering CMR has relatively low political and social cost and relatively high benefit to the society.

There are four principles that challenges healthy democratic CMR in this century: (1). Continuing potential of military intervention (2). Need to deal with militaries that remain influential even after their withdrawal from politics, particularly important in countries where military have been strong, such as Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua, South Korea, Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. (3) Challenges faced by both are that redefining the roles and missions of the military (4) The final challenge is to recognize and respond to the altered relationship between military and society.

Present concern

General observation and opinion about the US involvement in War are drawing a new concern about the CMR with respect to civilian supremacy.

The first American-led wars of the new century have redefined the boundaries of the civil-military relationship in United States. The generals, willingly or not, seem to be the guiding hand in decisions of broad strategic importance. But it is observed that U.S. civilian leadership, ultimately, must bear responsibility for charting their strategic course in this rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape.

U.S. foreign and defense policy have been increasingly shaped in-theater by the immediate knowledge, experience, and objectives of the military rather than by concepts and strategies developed by civilian leadership in Washington. It is suggested that the next critical steps for both Iraq and Afghanistan must be part of a well-defined, integrated, grand strategy made at the highest level, defined by the president, his cabinet members, and their civilian and military experts.

So again Clausewitz is in order so as to internalize the primacy of the political end over military means.

One of the US departments of State publication [12] observes that when nation faces the momentous of war and peace, and at times of crisis, many nations turn to their military for leadership. But this is not necessarily true in Democracy: In democracies,

1. Defense issues and threats to national security must be decided through the representatives elected by the people. Military serves its nation rather than leads it. Military leaders advise elected leaders and carry out their decisions. This principle of civilian control and supremacy over the military is fundamental to democracy.

2. Civilians need to direct the nation's military and decide issues of national defense and security - not because they are necessarily wiser than military professionals, but because they are the people's representatives and are accountable for them.

3. The military exists to protect the nation and the freedoms of its people. It must not represent or support any particular political viewpoint or ethnic or social group. Its loyalty is to the larger ideals of the nation. The purpose of a military is to defend society, not define it.

4. Any government values the expertise and advice of military professionals in reaching policy decisions about defense and national security. But only the elected civilian leadership should make ultimate policy decisions on national defense and the military should implement them.

5. Armed services must remain separate from politics. The military are the neutral servants of the state and the guardians of society.

Chapter V

Civil-Military Relations in Nepal

Historical Background

Even before the unification of Nepal the King, ministerial courtier, and military commanders used to be close to the people and some close interaction used to take place in the country affairs and public welfare. People had a kind of direct access to the king (supreme military commander by virtue of his position) and they used to have a say as the stakeholder on country affair and military campaign. In a small society a more democratic practice prevailed then than one can think today.

“Nyaya Napaye Gorkha Janu (Go to Gorkha to get justice)” a famous saying during the King Ram Shah time is quoted even today in Nepal. This simply shows how the king used to be close and was concerned to the public welfare.

We all could boast today of being a Nepali because of King Prithvinarayan Shah's sole vision and effort to unify Nepal as one single entity. To be more rational and for the greater interest of our identity it will wise to set aside petty differences that may be raised today over the incidents that might have taken place during the unification campaign. Many of the parameter of human rights definitions of modern days does not carry any relevancy to those days' definitions. In different paradigm the democratic practice of CMR in those days were quite noteworthy; even a common people could approach and advice the king - the ruler, supreme military commander and final civilian authority on nation's affair. To quote an example a Dalit (Damain by cast) had contributed a strategic advice/thought for fund collection by donating a rupee first and advised the king to do the same with all people. That was indeed an amicable gesture shown by a subject in support of launching the military campaign. That was the kind of democratic practice that prevailed then which shows the existence of a wonderful Civil Military Relations.

CMR Journey through Time:

CMR in Nepalese Context could be viewed as follows:

1. Pre Unification

All citizenry stood as fighting force and fought alongside with their king and commanders. The famous quote during the King Ram Shaha reign “Naya Napaye Gorkha Janu (Go to Gorkha to get justice)” simply illustrates the existence of cordial relation and the practice of justice then.

2. During Unification & Expansion

This was a period of Military Campaign envisioned and led by King Prithvi Narayan Shah for unification. A kind of practice of conscription existed then which established a belief that "every soldier is a citizen and every citizen a soldier." The example of a dalit donating a rupee to the king to wage war shows a kind of cordial CMR existed then. In later part of unification campaign heavy influence of few elite groups (Thapa, Pandey and few others) over the politics and the military prevailed which lead to the ill practices of nepotism, favoritism, and chakari system.

3. 104-Years of Rana Regime

A system of clean distinction between the Ruler and the Ruled prevailed throughout the nation. A culture of family Generals and public Soldier; and nepotism, favoritism, and chakari pratha became the norm of those days. CMR existed in only one form and that was in the form of relation between master and sub-servant, and it was at its worst.

From the unification period till the period of Rana regime a mixed kind of CMR based on Huntington's objective civilian control, Janowitz's convergence theory of constabulary force, and Schiff's concordance theory of cooperation among the three partners- the military, political elites and citizenry prevailed. But with the advent of democracy in B.S. 2007 Nepal mostly experienced the subjective civilian control type of CMR.

4. CMR in Democratic Transition

a. Post Rana & Panchayat Period (2007-2047)

Army amongst other remained one of the most important elements of National Power. Rana and some Elite Group’s influence prevailed in the army. The army under the patronage of the king remained untouched by civilian authority. Army enjoyed a kind of privileged institution only in status but remained deprived from its very basic needs of soldering. Army got exposure to outside world through foreign training and peacekeeping operation. Intake of officer corps increased from people in general and; in 2025 BS a group of officers graduated from Military Academy of Nepal. Practice of civilian supremacy and civil control did not exist in this period, and if at all existed, it existed in a very humble way.

b. Multi-party democratic Government (2047-2065)

Rana and some Elite Groups’ Influence diluted. The Civilian Control over the army had been established by the 1991 constitution of Nepal. But the ill practice of democracy and governance never attempted to address the army issue. The party and the government alike failed to take the Army to their confidence. The government have rather humiliated and deprived the Army from their very basic needs (clothing, shelter, trainings, allowances and facilities) and tried to diminish even their essential moral.

Left with no choice the army came closer to the king, the constitutional supreme commander for their guardianship and patronage. But the army failed the test of time to prove their so well understood loyalty towards the king and monarchy and their so called loyalty simply turned out to be loyalty of convenience.

Case Studies

1. Holeri Case:

A brief account

28th of Ashadh 2058; place Holeri, Rukum Far Western Nepal: - The Maoist party senior level leaders and members had gathered at Holeri with force to attend a programme and to celebrate their success of overrunning one of the police post.

As a routine exercise of security deployment, one platoon sized army unit was dropped at Holeri, which happened to be near the place where the Maoists were staging their programme. The army was unaware of the Maoist programme and the platoon presumed the gathering as a kind of regular public activities.

Since army was not engaged in fighting with the Maoist till then, the unexpected landing of the army troop created confusion among the Maoist leaders and cadres. Presuming the Army had come into action and as an act of retaliation in desperation, the Maoist cadres opened fire at the returning Helicopter inflicting damage to it and injuring the pilot. The Maoist cadres congregated around the army unit and tried to encircle it while the army fired few shells of Mortar bomb in self defense to stop the Maoist advance. There was stand-off for a few hours, a kind of understanding was reached for no offence on either side and the army unit withdrew. It was very good for the Maoist that the army unit did not open their full fire power in self defence, which otherwise would have inflicted heavy casualties on Maoist. Even while extricating the army unit from the site the army could have taken action against the Maoist in strength (since the Maoist had opened fire first) which would have changed the whole political equation of today.

Aftermath

Having been briefed about the incident the then Prime Minister (PM) Girija Prasad Koirala ordered the army to be mobilized and take action against the Maoist. The PM may have taken this moment as an opportune time to use army against the Maoist, but took the decision to mobilize the army all by himself. The army neither denied nor obeyed the order; rather they conducted a light operation from the local units. The army in real term did not mobilize in strength with a view to encircle the Maoist which came to light only after few days when the Maoists’ successful dispersal from "Holeri" came as the news. PM Koirala felt deceived by the army and took it as an offence of military disobedience to civilian order. On this ground to show resentment toward the King and the army and to establish the civilian supremacy PM Koirala resigned from his office.

Analysis

The politico-psychological/psycho-political aspect of then PM Koirala will not be taken to rationalize the analysis. The analysis will be based purely on the constitutional provision on army mobilization.

The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 2047 (1990), in its clause 118, had made provisions regarding the Royal Nepal Army.

According to the clause 118 (1); there shall be a National Defence Council of Nepal consisting of the following as Chairman and members:-

a. the Prime minister Chairman

b. the Defence minister Member; and

c. the Commander-in-Chief Member

Clause 118 (2) says, His Majesty shall operate and use the Royal Nepal Army on the recommendation of the National Defence Council.

Clause 118 (3) says, the establishment and management of the Royal Nepal army, and other matters relating thereto shall be as determined by law.

Clause 118 (4) says, The National Council shall have the power to regulate its working procedures on its own.

Clause 119 of the Constitution had made a provision of - Supreme Command of the Royal Nepal Army and Appointment of the Commander-in-Chief.

According to Clause 119 (1) His Majesty is the Supreme Commander of the Royal Nepal Army.

According to Clause 119 (2) His Majesty shall appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Nepal Army on the recommendation of the Prime Minister.

The Constitution had candidly made a provision of Subjective Civilian Control over the military in the form of Civilian Control by Constitutional Form through the establishment of National Defence Council. Here the issue of civilian supremacy is in a way done away with the presence of His Majesty.

1. Prime Minister's position did not allow recommending His Majesty through National Defence Council to mobilize the Army; but did allow PM to give direct order to mobilize the army.

2. The Army did not/could not mobilize on the PM's order simply because it did not get order the way it should have got; and as the constitution has made a provision for the same.

3. This cannot be taken simply as a case of military disobedience to civilian control; because the constitution had made a provision for civilian control to follow a system which for some reason the PM did not think was required.

4. The crux of the problem does not lie on the issue of military disobedience, rather it lies on the resentment of the civilian authority to comply with the constitutional provision of His Majesty as the Supreme Commander and his and only his right to mobilize the army.

5. The other reason is that the civilian authority never attempted to take the army in confidence and outcaste them as the army of the king and not belonging to the people. This has lead to establishment of only a workable civil-military relations but not a good one.

2. Dunai Case

A brief account:

On 9th of Ashoj, 2058 night, the district headquarters Dunai of Dolpa district came under Maoist attack. The target indeed was the district police headquarter. While the attack was launched the nearby army barrack was also engaged with fire from the surrounding hills. The carnage continued throughout the night and the Maoist walked away in victory mood early next morning leaving behind several police personnel dead and a partially destroyed district headquarter.

The nearby Army barracks, a company headquarters witnessed the incident though not visible from distance but did not come out of the barrack to counter the Maoist attack and support the police. Following day after returning from the site visit the minister of home affair Govinda Raj Joshi made some sarcastic comment and critical remark about the Royal Nepal Army and questioned about its relevance of being. Consequently for his remark he had to resign from his position of minister under pressure from power centre.

Analysis

Since the Nepal Army had restrained its mobilization against the Moaist without the all party consensus, it had also refrained from getting engaged with them except for self-defence. The same psyche was obvious which was displayed in Dunai. Besides the mobilization of the army as per the constitutional provision had not taken place, thus the Brigade headquarter could not give order to its company at Dunai. The Army Headquarter by principle was bound by constitutional provision and could not give order for any mobilization and so did happen in Dunai case as well.

In real sense in a situation like in Dunai, no civilian authority will be in the position to give order or even to make request to the army but only through proper channel or by fulfilling the formality of security committee. Being an important part of the security bodies of the district the army has its own obligation to meet to ensure the safety and security of the district as a whole and not to mention of the district headquarter.

Though not on a legal reason but on the moral reason the commander on the ground had obligation to meet and should have come out to support the police and the administration. May be the local commander would have risked his career if he had acted on his one but the immediate higher command could have taken initiatives by granting latitude to the local commander and informing the same to the higher headquarters. This did not happen and the army has to own this mistake.

Here was no such case of disobedience of civilian order like in Holeri case, but it was more of a moral obligation that had been overlooked or compromised by the army. The resignation of the minister of home affair Govinda Raj Joshi had anything to do with the civilian supremacy and civilian control over the army but it definitely reflects the existence of a not so good CMR then.

3. Dang Case

A brief account

Night of 8th of Mangsir, 2058; the army barracks of Ghorai Dang was attacked by Maoist, killing a few soldiers including the company commander, a Major. This was the first ever attack on a army barrack and Maoist left with the highest number of modern military weapons ever looted. Surprise was the success factor for the Maoist, and lack of intelligence and awareness and unpreparedness of the army unit was the setback for the army. The army did not retaliated for three days and came into action only on third day.

Analysis

1. Make believe syndrome

The army was made to believe that the Maoist will never dare to attack a military barrack since they were no match to the army power. Both the party in a way evaded direct confrontation by avoiding each other from coming to head on collision in routine duty. Maoist cadres at their check points maintained amicable relations with the soldiers on leave whereas police were made targets all over. Army in general was made to believe that the Maoist being a political problem will be solved in political way or through some political means; but forgot to appraise the fact that the ultimate means for that political end will be the army itself. Since the army was not mobilized the army was made to believe again that there may be no need to fight the Maoist; consequently the army was in no mood to fight and mentally not prepared to fight the Maoist.

2. Resist at all cost syndrome

From the very beginning the army resisted the government's effort to mobilize the army against the Maoist. The army requested/demanded for the major parties’ if not all parties’ consensus as a condition for its mobilization, which was never achieved. Here the army had a point to make and logic to defend its stance:

a. Once the army is mobilized with clear mandate and terms of references from the government to sort-out the Maoist armed insurgence, the army may not be called back till the mandate has been completed. If a government under some party leadership decides to call back the army prematurely, which was likely as well, the credibility of the army would be compromised but it would be at the cost of national interest. The army wanted to ensure this guarantee through all party consensuses.

b. Once the army is mobilized it will need a continuous support from the government to sustain its operation. This would be possible only through the all party consensus so as to guarantee the support regardless of being any party in the office.

c. Here few important points need to be noted: one, why the political parties could not convince the king then? two, was the army told to seek and take stand for the all party consensus ? was the army not capable enough to deal with the maoist, which is least likely? three, whether the political parties were never in a mood to solve the Maoist problem and wanted to play Maoist one against the other party whichever is in office? four, was it because of some unseen and unknown nexus existed among/between the political parties, the king, the Maoist or some international stakeholder. There could be one or a combination of any one or more of all the above mentioned possibilities.

d. Since the army stood fast for its demand/request without proposing some other workable solution the political party in government looked for easy alternative. The government decided to use the police force with extra resources; and not to mention here about the individual interest attached to it, which turned out to be a blunder and counterproductive subsequently.

3. Set-mind Syndrome

The army was living with a set-mind that the mobilization can or will take place only after His Majesty gives approval to the recommendation made by the National Defence Council. Moreover, the army seems to have developed a set-mind about the constitutional provision regarding the army mobilization, and had convinced itself and nothing otherwise and the only condition for their mobilization. Since the government was furnishing the police the army seems to have made up a kind of their mind that they may not even need to fight. Consequently the army and the nation had to pay a price for this set-mind syndrome and became Counter- productive as follows:

a. Like in the past the army did not/could not mobilize itself even for own self-defence after the attack in the Dang Barrack.

b. The army became a psychological captive of the constitutional provision and wasted three precious days to counter the Maoist attack. Had the army countered the Maoist attack the very next morning, which was very much within the army capability, the whole game would have taken a different turn. It may be rather a big may be - the army would have forced the Maoist to come to a negotiated settlement in political terms. Why it did not happen could be seen as under:

i. As its own barrack had been attacked the regional commander should have retaliated by counter attacking by mobilizing the local units. He may not need to justify for the mobilization for self defence.

ii. The commanders at the Army Headquarter were equally to be blamed for not taking initiatives for mobilization, taking charge of the crisis situation and supporting the operation -a blunder from army Headquarter.

iii. Lack of decision making at the apex level became the cause of debacle. The Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) Gen Prajwolla Rana, was on foreign tour (Germany) and the acting COAS (Lt Gen Durga Nath Aryal) by nature lacked the courage to take decision. The COAS should have mobilized the army and then informed the Supreme Commander for his approval and to the worst he could have seeked an urgent audience with His Majesty and taken orders from him.

iv. The PM (Sher Bdr Deuba) could have taken initiative to activate the National Defence Council for the earliest mobilization of the army.

v. Since nothing had taken place and every one in position were responsible but no one was made accountable for their incompetence.

Consequently the army and the nation had to pay a price for this set-mind syndrome and the cost of hypocritical loyalty towards the king proved to be very expensive.

To conclude, the Dang Case in a way does justify the army's previous action of not being mobilized in support of "Dunai" incident and "Holeri" incidents.

Issue of Civilian supremacy in Nepal

The concept of Civilian supremacy has been promulgated by few US and European scholars and came into being in the literature of CMR in the context of America and Western European nations. The exercise of this concept is still debated since its practice even in US has not been consistent. It works well in a country where the ideal form of democracy has been established and Huntington's Objective Civilian Control prevails, in other words where the political practice based on the ideal democratic philosophy and the professional military work together. By contrast the generals are still a guiding hand in decisions of broad strategic importance, but it is observed that U.S. civilian leadership, ultimately, must bear responsibility for charting their strategic course. U.S. foreign and defense policy have been increasingly shaped in-theater by the military rather than by civilian leadership in Washington. It is suggested that the next critical steps must be a well-defined, integrated, grand strategy made at the highest level, defined by the president, his cabinet members, and their civilian and military experts. This shows that the practice of CMR is not easy even for the USA, the profounder and propagator of all the theories of CMR. To expect and try to exercise the concept of civilian supremacy thus would be too early in case of Nepal.

Nepal has a long way to go to come to this stage and the concept of Civilian supremacy is very new to us and not to mention about its practice in the past. The phrase - Civilian supremacy, in a way, is just been heard since recent past, and to be more specific from the day of Gen Katwal's dismissal by the decision of Maoist Government and his reinstatement again by the President’s order. The rational of government action and the justification of president's step could be debated, but it cannot be free for all to claim their right on their interpretation and take the parliament as the hostage to their claim. This should be left to the Supreme Court to decide and for that matter any such other issues should come under the arena of apex court to decide. This is been argued that whether the decision to remove Gen Katwal was a government decision or a decision of the Maoist party though through cabinet even after boycotted by other member of the cabinet. There could a counter question - who gave any one the right to take away the public freedom in the name of civilian supremacy? Is it not an attempt to impose the civilian supremacy at the cost of the public supremacy?

The Civilian supremacy is not a well defined and understood term in Nepal and trying to exercise it in its raw and least developed form will be like an attempt to dance 'Salsa in Jhaure' tune. Without understanding the ethos of civilian supremacy, if it is exercised to serve some party's interest it is bound to be counterproductive.

Civilian control is a continuation or a manifestation of civilian supremacy and there are theories on civilian control but no theory on civilian supremacy. This concept is rather applied differently in different situation based on the prevailing social, cultural, and political environment. Nepal has to find an amicable way to exercise the civilian supremacy that suites best to our context and not harp blindly to make a point of prestige for the greater interest of the nation.

The CMR during 2065 has further deteriorated and reached to the stage of a kind of institutional confrontation between the Maoist party government and the army. Even nation seems divided on the exercise of civilian supremacy and civilian control over the army on the issues of recruitment, term of eight generals and participation of Maoist army in South Asian game. The decision to dismiss the army chief Gen Katwal and reinstating him on the same day by the president has raised the row to its apex and ended with the fall of Maoist led government as the climax of the civilian supremacy issue raised by the Maoist party. The standoff is still on due to the Maoist party stand demanding for the correction of the president's step in the name of civilian supremacy. Nepal experienced the worst ever civil-military relations in its history during the nine months period of Maoist led party government.

Impediments to CMR

The present Impediments of good CMR in Nepal has to be analyzed and understood on its historical, socio-cultural and psycho-political background. There are Ego Problem between army and the government, and amongst the military commanders and political leaders. There is false understanding of army of not being loyal to the people and equally so being loyal to the monarchy. There is a lack of knowledge and understanding about the army and army officers which is turn is the cause of misunderstanding. The isolated nature of the army and its reluctance to mix up with civilian is important factor of impediments for CMR. The Weak MOD and neglected policy on CMR are some other causes.

So this calls for new initiative and effort to build confidence and understanding between army and civilian, such as:

1. Defining roles of army (Define the role of national army in the changed context; and develop its capability accordingly)

2. Facilitate communication and constructive engagement (Regular interaction between army, MOD and citizenry to reduce misunderstanding and clarify Grey Areas.)

3. Getting to Know Each Other’s Strengths & weakness (The public in general and elites in particular has to recover from their jaundiced eye perception about the army - Today's army personnel are educated, better exposed and has become more sensible, understanding, responsible and better citizen of Nepal)

4. The Confidence Building Measures could be: Addressing the issue of Victims and Guilty of conflict (As the process of confidence building - the guilty during the conflict period both from Security organization and Maoist Organization alike have to be brought to justice) The main issue should be to address the damage done to the victims from all sectors and help them to recover from it through a pragmatic way by earliest disclosure about the state of victims and their whereabouts in whatever form and based on truth to the closest possible; providing adequate compensation by the state to the families/dependent of the victims verified by truth commission, and may be a scheme of Grand National Amnesty to both party to facilitate for reintegration and integration in the society and security institutions. There is a need for image enhancement of the Army through their more Involvements in Nation building, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian activities. Democratization of army within the military norms and ethics and professionalization of Maoist combatants who wish to be integrated in the army has to be addressed pragmatically.

Exercise of Civilian supremacy should be more in the line of confidence building and establishing coordination to bring about synergy between the army and civil authority than creating an environment of domination or disturbing the established norms and tradition of army in the name of civilian control. The army may even be called by democratic government as last resort SOS to bring about stability in country as has been done in Bangladesh. The relationship between the Civilian and Military needs to be synchronized well in the existing social structure and dynamics of psychology, philosophy, culture and politics. This will generate a wonderful synergy to serve the country and the people. Here the Civil Society has a crucial role to play as a beneficiary, watchdog, and whistle blower, and partner and advocate of reforms. A strong and proactive Track-II initiative is of dire need of time along with Track-I and Track-II to enhance the CMR.

Formulation and implementation of National Security Policy; Restructuring the National Security Council; Employment of professional Security Advisor; Security Sector reform of Army and MOD; Addressing the issue of integration and reintegration; Transparency in equal opportunity employment in the army; Study on the subject; and Debates/Open Forum discussions are the tools to develop better CMR Nepal.

The tools to develop better CMR Nepal could be as follows:

1. Preparation and Implementing the National Security policy as soon as possible.

2. Restructuring the National Security Council in a pragmatic way based on standard practice.

3. Security Sector reform of Army and MOD:

a. The MOD need to be restructured, strengthened and empowered with competent and trained personnel from civil service and the army to exercise the civil control over the army.

b. The army needs fine tuning by enhancing system based and transparent functioning and practice as internal reform. Right sizing of the Army could be planned based on our defense policy with due consideration of integrating the Maoist army and resources available. The planning of right sizing can take place in three phases in 10 years time.

4. Employment of professional Security Advisor but not from party politics.

Study on the Subject

This is a very new subject in our context and draws a lot of attentions from all the section of our society; hence debate and open forum discussions have to be conducted.

1. Civil Society

Civil Society has a crucial role to play in SSR as a beneficiary, watchdog, 'Whistle Blower', partner and advocate of reforms. A developed and vibrant civil society that can stimulate public debate, engage and represent local communities, facilitate dialogue, develop partnerships with governments and hold them to account.

2. The three track initiatives

We have not been able to exercise 3 - track (Track III, Track II & Track I) initiatives for confidence building effort. These "low input & high output" informal initiatives give opportunity to the people to get involved in the national issues like in reformulating the traditional role of security which can restructure the process of democratization, development and national security. Among the 3 - track initiatives, a proactive Track II initiative is of dire need at present and it can make a lot of contribution to bring about changes in CMR.

Chapter VI

Conclusion

The world wars and countless major conflicts have changed the employment of the militaries beyond recognition. In the course empires have come and gone; states have grown and declined. The modern era has brought enormous social changes, and military power continues to dominate international relations. The role of the military today is as central to global societies as it ever was.

According to Huntington future CMR will be shaped by the success and failure of civilian governments in implementing economic reform and preserving law and order; and by the ability of weak political leaders to resist the temptation to look at the military for support.

According to Huntington the success factors of new democracy in restructuring Civil-military relations are the growing acceptance of the norms of military professionalism and civil control, the movement of civilian control has been in the interest of both civilians and armed forces and the re-ordering CMR has relatively low political and social cost and relatively high benefit to the society.

On the other hand playing politics with the military could be like playing with a double-edges sword as has happened in Pakistan and Bangladesh in our region.

There are four principles that challenge healthy democratic CMR in this century: (1). Continuing potential of military intervention (2). Need to deal with militaries that remain influential even after their withdrawal from politics (3) Challenges faced by both are that redefining the roles and missions of the military (4) The final challenge is to recognize and respond to the altered relationship between military and society.

As with so many political and strategic issues, the future of Nepal Civil-military relations can be distilled to assumptions. Just because the Nepalese Army stood firmly, cohesively, and in strength as an apolitical entity, Nepal did not face disaster in recent past. The objective could be to develop a competent professional army able to contribute to the policymaking in national security but not to dominate it; stand as a formidable deterrence force in time of need; be a savior of the citizen and work hand-in-hand with people of Nepal in all eventualities. The subject of CMR in Nepal should be a field of continuous study and open to debate. The enhancement of civil-military relationship need not be emphasized more in changed context of Nepal.

It is time to mend the differences, develop understanding and build confidence. It is well known fact that a thousand meetings, negotiations, conferences and dialogues are worth than a single conflict or confrontation. Conflicts and confrontations widen gaps and leaves scars difficult to mend. Thus the political leaders and army leaders should grow and try to engage in confidence building efforts rather than exchanging rhetoric. This kind of immature exercise, use of undiplomatic and rude verbatim will limit the room and opportunity for further engagements. So let us shelve the differences and misunderstanding of the past and join hands together for the greater of national interest.

Reference:

1. Civilian control of the military - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, article, 28 Jul 2009. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil-military_relations

2. Charls H. Kennedy and David J Loucher, Civil- military Interaction: Data in Search of Theory, p.1, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1-2, 1-10 (1991)

3. Samual P Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 1957, ISBN 0674817362

4. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, April 1960, ISBN-10: 0029161703, ISBN-13: 978-0029161708

5. Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and its Impact on Civil-Military Relations. Paper prepared for the International Studies Association 50th Annual Convention, February 2009. (p.776- 790)

6. Kenneth W. Kemp and Charles Hudlin; Civil Supremacy over the Military: Its Nature and Limits, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 19, No. 1, 7-26 (1992)

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8. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943, publication September 2006.

9. The DCAF Backgrounder series, 05/2008, on Security Sector Governance and Reform

10. Rebecca L. Schiff, Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance

11. Wim F. van Eekelen, Democratic Control of Armed Forces: The National and International Parliamentary Dimension, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), occasional paper – No. 2, Geneva, October 2002 (p. 1-3, 5-6, 3-27)

12. U.S. Department of State publication, USA Democracy in Brief; 03 May 2008; article Civil-Military Relations.

13. Brian D. Taylor, Department of Political Science, Syracuse University, Civil-Military Relations Theory and the State, Paper prepared for the International Studies Association 50th Annual Convention, February 2009