It is indeed a very welcome step that the government has taken by forming a commission of a professional group of people to suggest recommendations for reforming both the police forces (Civil police & the Armed Police Force (APF)) and the National Investigation Department (NID). This exercise of Security Sector Reform (SSR) was a much needed initiative. Now SSR in the judicial sector and prison administration should follow suit, since the main philosophy and ultimate aim of SSR is concerned with human security in its totality.
Sometime in the near future some a high level 'special committee' is likely to be formed with the purpose of developing modalities for the integration of Maoist Combatants (MC) into the security forces, more specifically into the Nepalese Army (NA). However, if the issue of integration of Maoist combatants into the NA becomes the committee's only purpose then the scope of the 'special committee' is going to be very narrow and recommendations for sustainable solutions are less likely to come. The issue of reintegration of MC has to be addressed within holistic approach - giving various attractive options of reintegration to the all of the MC in a free atmosphere without any political pressure on their individual choices ( The Defense Minister's recent remarks on this issue are thus welcome). One of the options before MC should be integration into the NA. But certain criteria should be applied to MC who wish to enter the NA and they should be told candidly what these criteria are. This should include: relinquishment of membership of their party membership, subjection to the same training and competition as the rest of the NA troops to develop their professionalism, and subjection to military law once they are enrolled in the NA.
The issue of integration of MC in the security forces demands serious analysis regarding its long term consequences and requires a well thought out plan. This has to be brought under a broader perspective of SSR of security institutions including that of the army. First of all the political parties and the public have to identify and agree upon the question: which security institutions are MC going to be integrated into? As the integration of some of the MC in security forces including the NA have already been agreed to (though perhaps informally), it has to take place. If serious analysis about the characteristics and capabilities of security forces and the MC, and the likely consequences of integration are carried out then some pragmatic and logical recommendations can be made.
The first recommendation is regarding integration into security forces other than the NA: the organizational characteristics, existing laws and rules, morale and cohesiveness of both police forces and the NID will be disrupted if the MC are inducted into it. They will not be able to absorb and dilute the hyperactive energy of the MC. There is rather a strong possibility that the MC will politically influence these organizations in a way that will not be in the national interest. The second recommendation is regarding the integration of MC into the NA: the organizational characteristics of NA, its binding by military law, its morale, discipline, cohesiveness and its apolitical nature make it capable of absorbing and diluting MC influence. This is the reason why that the MC, after being given several attractive alternatives to reintegrate and rehabilitate, can be integrated into the NA if they so wish.
The issue of integration of MC into the NA is closely related to our Defense Policy, which in turn is closely associated with the National Security Policy of Nepal. The National Security Policy, also known as the Comprehensive Security Policy, encompasses all aspects of national interest, and defense policy forms the most important part of it. The defense policy of any country is based on the analysis of its geopolitical environment; threat analysis (external as well as internal) and challenges to be countered; and the resources available. Based on the defense policy - defense doctrine, strategy and tactics, size of the armed forces, their weapon system, training and equipment are designed to meet the "felt need" of the organization; and it is important to remember this at this juncture.
The equivocal remarks on 'National Security Policy' and 'Defense Policy' made and expressed by the defense minister and other Maoist leaders at various platforms has confused the general masses of people and elites alike. First of all, it should be known to all concerned that the 'National Security Policy of Nepal' does exist in a complete draft form; but for some procedural reason it has not been formalized and implemented. Defense policy has been in existence for a long time and is reviewed regularly by Army Headquarters. Hence the rhetoric from Maoist leaders about rewriting a new 'National Security Policy' and the 'Defense Policy' sounds like an ego-centric gesture and an effort to take credit for writing a new National Security Policy. Instead of wasting time, effort and resources on the pretext of writing a new 'National Security Policy', the existing draft of could be modified and refined to suit the changed context and then implemented. Unwarranted 'reinvention of the wheel' can be avoided.
At present, the felt need for integration of MC into the NA may override the need for 'right sizing' of the army, which is a component of Nepal's defense policy. But this short term and one time exercise does not necessarily compromise the need of the nation for which the institution of NA has been created for. So the integration of MC into NA raises two questions - What kind of national army do we need, and how are we going to achieve this? Do we need an effective army of small size - potent, mobile with ample fire power and optimum kill and yield potential with force multiplier capability? Or do we need a large sized and conventional army as exists now with strength of over 100,000 (after integration) equipped with standard weapon systems, mobility, equipments and training. To address the present need of integration and considering available resources the second option could be the right choice for the day. Based on the attrition rate and incentive retirement scheme, a five years plan could be designed for right sizing of the national army to suit our defense policy. Since defense management focuses on a prospective plan of 15 years or even more, a proposed plan for five years to streamline the National Army is not difficult.
It is strongly believed that Maoist leaders are seeking advice from a few so-called experts, who negatively influence them on issues and information related to the Nepalese Army and integration. They better verify the credibility and competence of the people they are seeking advice from; vetting is very important at this point of time. What is most important today is to build confidence among the Maoist-led government, the political parties and the Nepal Army. The misunderstandings and distrust need to be sorted out and the cold relations between the Maoist leaders and the army must be brought to an end. This calls for a proactive informal initiative, a pragmatic Track - II initiative in particular, led by experts and preferably by a few trusted personalities with credibility for both the parties.
Published in 'The Kathmandu Post' on 25 October 2008
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